


50X1-HUM

**Page Denied**

**SECRET**

67/10

# World-wide Perspectives



## KEY DATES

7 November - 50th Anniversary of Bolshevik Revolution

20 December - Communist Day of Solidarity with National Liberation  
Front of South Vietnam

4-11 January - Havana Cultural Congress (representatives from Asia,  
Africa and Latin America)

50X1-HUM

(WWP Cont.)

50X1-HUM

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs  
(to 20 September 1967)

1. Speculation that the Soviet leaders have decided to renew their efforts to convene a world Communist conference was stirred by a series of fresh calls for such a meeting by such prominent leaders as Hungarian Premier Kallai and Party boss Kadar, Bulgarian Deputy Premier Zhivko Zhivkov, and Polish Party boss Gomulka.

Most of their statements denounced the Chinese Communists, confirming the generally-held opinion that the Soviet objective is to use the conference to put the stamp of world Communist approval on Soviet policies and condemnation on the Chinese. However, the WASHINGTON POST's Moscow correspondent Anatole Shub suggested a new interpretation in his column of 18 September: Discounting the "anti-Chinese" explanation (after having accepted it in his column the day before) on the ground that the Maoists have already virtually isolated themselves from the mass of pro-Soviet and independent parties, he wrote that "many signs suggest that the current drive is a showdown against the 'National Communists' of Rumania.... Veiled attacks on them have begun to proliferate, despite gestures of appeasement from Bucharest." He cited as examples an article by Kadar, printed in PRAVDA on 17 September, which "was partly directed against Rumania," and an article by Czech Party Secretary Koucky in the current issue of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM (WORLD MARXIST REVIEW) which "declared it 'inadmissible' that an individual party define for itself what is and what is not Marxism-Leninism ... precisely that right which the Rumanians have claimed."

2. Rumania, after having refused to sign the final statement of the June Moscow summit of Communist states on the Arab-Israeli conflict and having boycotted the July follow-up meeting in Budapest, participated in a 5-6 September meeting in Belgrade to coordinate future assistance to the Arab countries. However, Rumania's continued refusal to label Israel an aggressor caused a delay of 18 hours in reaching agreement on a joint communique, resulting in a final text characterized by "glaring blandness," according to NEW YORK TIMES correspondent Richard Eder.

3. Rumania also stood apart as the USSR and East Germany completed this year's series of alliance renewals with all the other Warsaw Pact countries. (It will be recalled that Rumania moved in the other direction by establishing full diplomatic relations with West Germany on 31 January 1967.) The current Soviet-Rumanian treaty is due to expire next February, though it is automatically renewed for 5 years if not specifically denounced by one of the signatories.

4. Communist China is suffering continuing, chaotic, armed conflict with widespread disruption of transportation and communications, despite Peking's attempts during this past month to curb the Red Guards and get the industrial workers and farmers back to production.

Communist China's relations with most of the rest of the world continued to deteriorate during the past month. Notable events were:

a. Persecution of foreigners in Peking including flagrant physical mistreatment of the British Charge d'Affaires on 30 August, house arrest of the Reuters correspondent and the Italian trade representative, refusal to grant exit visas to personnel of the British and Indonesian Embassies, and expulsion of three of the nine Japanese correspondents.

b. A new border clash with Indian troops in Sikkim, beginning 11 Sept.

c. Chicom protest notes to the governments of Kenya, Laos and Tunisia, over alleged hostile actions.

d. Dissolution of the Cambodian-Chinese Friendship Association by Cambodia's Sihanouk, who also condemned China's interference in Cambodia's internal affairs in a press conference on 11 September.

e. Delivery by the USSR on 31 August of its fifth official protest in three weeks to the Chinese People's Republic, this time charging that a Sino-Soviet meeting on shipping in border rivers was wrecked by the Chinese delegation's insistence that border demarcation questions be included on the agenda. The note recalled that consultations on border demarcation, begun in 1964, were broken off by the Chinese.

5. Czech relations with Austria reached a post-war low as a result of four August incidents in which Czech guards fired into Austrian territory while aiming at parties of Czechs, East Germans, and Poles trying to escape across the border. Meanwhile, there is continuing evidence of the Czechoslovakian regime's difficulty in coping with a high level of intellectual ferment. A milestone was reached by the publication in LITERARNI NOVINY of a front-page tribute, on the 30th anniversary of his death, to Thomas Masaryk, popularly revered founder of the Czechoslovak state whose memory was first condemned and then ignored by the Czech press after the Communist takeover.

6. The smaller Communist parties of Western Europe have suffered setbacks, as revealed by the following evidence:

a. In Sweden, the "anti-revisionist" hard-liners, who have struggled against Party Chairman Hermansson's determined drive to disassociate the CP from its old image and identify it with the socialist left, bolted to form an opposition party, the "Communist Union of Marxists and Leninists." The platform of the new party includes these Chinese-attuned slogans:

"-- Reveal and fight Soviet revisionists' cooperation with the U.S. imperialists.

-- Support the people in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe in their struggle against the attempt of the ruling leadership to re-introduce capitalism." (NORRSKENS FLAMMAN, Lulea, 8 July 1967.)

b. The pro-Chinese dissident Belgian CP (the most significant pro-Chinese group in W. Europe) lost most of its activists among the southern, French-speaking Walloons, who broke away to re-establish their own "Walloon CP." The platform of the new party is more Maoist than that of its parent group (which has refused to follow Peking in attacking Liu Shao-chi!) (LA GAUCHE, Brussels, 5 August 1967.)

c. The Communist Party of Great Britain is in grave difficulties. Membership has declined for three successive years; a recruiting campaign fizzled -- only 700 were brought in during the year.

7. The South African government announced on 9 September the arrest of Yuriy Nikolaevich Loginov, a Soviet spy who has revealed a wealth of details regarding his lengthy training, past missions, other Soviet agents, etc.

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Newsweek

11 September 1967

**Doing Business With Mao**

Red China's cultural revolution has seriously eroded its trade with the rest of the world. Not only has it been a year of internal convulsion and irresponsibility; it has been a time of gross indignities to foreigners, to traders and diplomats alike, to the captains and crews of the ships on which trade depends. Skip-pers have been forced to plaster their vessels with thoughts and portraits of Mao—and when they objected, have been hauled before Red Guard "people's courts." Businessmen have been made to read aloud from Mao's "little red book" and to buy dozens of effigies of China's nightsoil-collecting heroes along with any order of toys. Hotel dining rooms these days are equipped with speakers blaring the thoughts of Mao at captive Western audiences. And one Swedish businessman who tried hard to evade the speakers reported that his Red Guard guide turned up each morning to read passages aloud from the little red book while the Swede ate his breakfast in bed.

Perhaps even more harmful to business, foreign traders have found themselves obliged to deal with inexperienced and inefficient members of the Red Guards who have taken over factories and port facilities. "Many experienced Chinese trade officials," said a Japanese Foreign Office spokesman, "have been expelled and replaced by members of the Red

Guard groups who are less competent, more dogmatic and much harder to deal with."

**Boycotts:** As a result of their ordeals, at least five qualified skippers have refused to take their ships back to China. One British captain, after being forced by Red Guards to apologize for tearing down Mao's portrait while in port at Whampoa, telephoned his resignation to his Hong Kong office on the spot. Six major shipping lines have temporarily suspended service to Chinese ports. Hong Kong business firms have found it necessary to pay bonuses to employees before they will agree to undertake assignments in China.

As China's foreign trade continues to crumble, it remains to be seen whether the damage inflicted by Mao and his Red Guard regime can be corrected. Traders in Tokyo and Hong Kong agree that even if the policies were checked tomorrow, the downward plunge of China's trade would continue for at least a year. Nevertheless, most Hong Kong businessmen are convinced that eventually workable trading conditions will return. "You have to be optimistic," said one. "It's a market of 700 million people. We wouldn't have put up with this gulf for so long if we didn't think that some day China and its huge markets would open up." Added another: "They're going to need to do a hell of a lot of trading to get out of the mess they've made."

WASHINGTON POST

3 September 1967

**Fears Flood of Canton Refugees****Hong Kong Rolls Out Barbed Wire**

(2)

By Forrest Edwards

HONG KONG, Sept. 2 (AP)

—The British began installing a barbed-wire fence along 10 miles of its border with Communist China today as a safeguard against a possible flood of refugees from the fighting in the Canton area.

British colonial leaders expressed fear that a heavy influx of refugees, untrained and unskilled, could swamp Hong Kong's economy.

Various reports from inside China say a sharp struggle continues in Canton, about 60 miles northeast of Hong Kong's border, between supporters of Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his opponents.

Rail traffic from Canton to

the border halted Saturday. This, plus a Radio Moscow broadcast saying fighting continued, cast doubt on claims by Maoists that they had seized control of Canton. The Moscow broadcast quoted eyewitnesses in Kwangtung Province, whose capital is Canton. There was no independent confirmation of the reports.

The barbed-wire barricade is going up between a few hundred yards and a half-mile behind the actual border fence. It is designed as a secondary line of defense.

Although colonial officials said they had no confirmation of reports that 30,000 to 70,000 Chinese in Kwangtung were preparing to flee to Hong Kong, the building of the fence shows that the govern-

ment has not forgotten its refugee crisis of 1962, when 200,000 Chinese flooded into the colony.

An estimated 80,000 got through the rural New Territories to Hong Kong's teeming tenement areas and hillside squatter hut areas. Another 100,000 to 120,000 were rounded up, trucked back to the border and handed over to the Communist Chinese.

Criticized in the United States and other non-Communist nations, Hong Kong lashed back with its own bitter criticism: neither the United States nor any of the other nations were willing to offer refuge to the Chinese.

Hong Kong is still working to house, clothe, feed and find jobs for the nearly two million Chinese refugees that have ar-

rived since the Communists took China in 1949.

Officials expressed hope that the mere presence of the new fence will act as a deterrent.

In 1962, Communist Chinese officials made no attempt to stop the refugees. This year, however, all signs so far indicate that the Communists are trying to prevent refugee escapes from China.

A Radio Moscow broadcast, monitored in Tokyo, said eyewitnesses in Canton reported that a few Maoists managed to seize the Canton radio for a brief time Thursday and broadcast a claim they had seized the city.

Moscow said the reports described the clashes around Canton as widespread and bloody. It said about 1000 persons were killed.



(3)

Translation from Dutch press:

De Volkskrant, 24 August 1967

TRADE WITH RED CHINA DECLINING

DUTCH EXPORTS NINE MILLION GUILDERS LOWER

(Our own correspondent)

The Hague, 24 August--The interest of Dutch firms in doing business with Communist China has declined in the last few months, talks with a number of importers and exporters indicate. The export figures for the first half of 1967 tend to confirm this conclusion. Up to the end of June, twenty million guilders of goods have been exported to China as compared with twenty-nine million in the same period of 1966 and forty-nine million in 1965.

According to insiders, the decline in interest in the China trade stems from recent "revolutionary" developments in China. Representatives of trading companies say they were not happy with their latest visits to China. There is concern about getting into trouble with the "red guards." One of the travelers stated that it is not unusual for westerners to be forced to sing love songs to Mao Tse-tung.

Discussion recently has been underway on a trade agreement between Peking and The Hague. The Chinese Government had suggested this in 1964. They sent a long list of items of trade to The Netherlands to serve as a basis for discussion. The Dutch traders have greatly altered the list. Among other things, the Chinese had placed much emphasis on exporting textiles to The Netherlands, but The Hague has had to be cautious in view of the difficulties in which its own textile industry now finds itself. The Chinese had listed fertilizer and ships as import possibilities. Since the amended list was sent back to Peking nothing more has been heard. Attempts to obtain a Peking reaction have elicited only the reply that "the time is not ripe" for further negotiations.

Further, the value of imports from Peking in the first half of 1967 is three times that of exports to Peking. Experts say that this is not unusual because Peking has consistently followed a policy of more exports than imports. When the total import value begins to equate the value of exports, import licenses are severely limited by the Chinese. Also, Dutch traders have learned that the government bureaus in China only buy goods for which there is an immediate need.

The Chinese employ an extremely rational system which is also aimed at purchasing at the best possible price. In view of the general reduction in China's imports, the Central chamber for Trade Promotion gives less weight to the argument of Dutch traders which holds that internal developments in China are seriously influencing Dutch exports to China and gives more weight to the possibility that China needs fewer Dutch goods.

(4)

NEW YORK TIMES

September 4, 1967

# TURMOIL HAMPER RED CHINA'S TRADE

**Exports Drop Faster Than Imports—Slump in Last 3 Months Is Pronounced**

**HONG KONG IS AFFECTED**

**Colony Develops Shortages of Food as Normal Supply From Mainland Shrinks**

By TILLMAN DURDIN

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, Sept. 3 —

The damaging consequences of the turmoil caused by the great proletarian cultural revolution in Communist China are beginning to be conspicuously evident in the country's foreign trade.

The trade slump is being felt with special acuteness in Hong Kong, which normally depends for half of its foods on supplies from Communist China.

Chinese Communist exports have dropped more sharply than imports, with the decline especially pronounced in the last three months.

If the present lower rate of exports continues, imports must inevitably follow suit since Peking by the end of this year will have appreciably less foreign exchange to spend for the purchase of products from abroad than in former years.

## Other Supply Sources

The drop in exports to Hong Kong, Communist China's principal foreign market, has been so large-scale that a shortage of some basic foods is developing here.

The colony is turning to other sources of supply for products that heretofore have mainly come from Communist China.

T. D. Sorby, the Director of Commerce and Industry in Hong Kong, today sent a letter to some 200 food importing firms drawing attention to the recent reduction in supplies of many commodities normally imported from Communist China.

Mr. Sorby said the purpose of his letter was to "point out the facts so that importers could

"make appropriate changes in their pattern of orders," or, in other words, buy from other places than Communist China.

## Drastic Drop

Mr. Sorby's figures showed that the river boats and junks delivering goods to Hong Kong had brought in only 250,159 tons for June, July and August compared with 463,821 tons for these months last year.

Only 56,765 tons of products arrived by boats and junks in August this year compared with 159,339 tons for August last year.

The commerce director's report on rail traffic into Hong Kong revealed an even more drastic drop. His figures showed only 3,496 loaded railway freight cars rolled into the colony from Kwangtung in June, July and August this year compared with 10,553 last year, and the number slumped last month to a mere 369 compared with 4,084 for August, 1966.

Ordinarily Communist China earns up to half its foreign exchange through exports to Hong Kong. Last year exports reached a value of \$480,770,000.

Because of continued high exports to Hong Kong for the earlier part of this year, the total of Communist China's exports here this year up through the end of July, the last month for which figures have been released, were still marginally higher than for the first seven months of 1966.

But the July figures this year dropped to almost half the amount for July, 1966, and August figures are expected to show an even bigger decline. If exports to Hong Kong were to continue at the level of July and August, Communist China's sales to this little British colony for 1967 would amount only to roughly three-quarters of the 1966 total. Peking would, in short, earn only \$360-million in hard currency foreign exchange here instead of \$480-million.

Figures for trade by other territories with Communist China are not as up-to-date as those of Hong Kong's but have begun to show the same trends as the Hong Kong figures.

Available figures show a decline in exports for every country except Italy, and the Italian figures only cover the first four months of 1967. It is believed recent Italian returns indicate a decline.

## Japanese Trade Dips

Japan's trade with Communist China is off particularly

sharply. Figures show Communist China's exports to Japan for the first six months of this year were worth \$145-million compared with \$156-million for 1966 and Communist China's purchases from Japan were down to \$133-million for this year compared with \$164-million for 1967.

Communist China's trade slump appears to be the result of disruption in interior transportation and production and of labor troubles and political interference at seaports, all stemming from the confusion and turbulence produced by the cultural revolution.

The severe curtailment of train traffic to Hong Kong, with no trains at all arriving on some days, is a reflection of what is happening also in other parts of the country in railway traffic.

Regular stevedoring labor of ports seems virtually to have vanished. Port authorities have tried to use Red Guards for substitute workers but the result has been slow and cargo damage extensive.

## Shipping Delays

Reliable sources estimate average delays for ships into Tsingtao of more than four weeks and for ships in Shanghai and Dairen of more than three weeks. Ships at other ports take up to at least two weeks for loading and unloading.

The drop in exports to Hong Kong, officials here say, reflects no unwillingness, because of the Communist insurgency inside the colony, of the Kwangtung Chinese to sell products to Hong Kong.

Sales have slumped, they say, simply because curtailed and disrupted transportation facilities are unable to deliver products to Hong Kong in normal quantities.

The disruption of railway traffic from Kwangtung into the Yangtse Valley is indicated by the state of hog shipments into Hong Kong. These have fallen to less than a third of the normal 35,000-to-40,000 usually exported here monthly and those that are coming are from Kwangtung and not from the main sources of supply in Hunan, Hupeh and other Yangtse Valley Provinces.

Because it now has to turn to Australia, Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand for food supplies, Hong Kong faces a much higher food bill than it has been paying for the cheap food that has been coming from Communist China.

WASHINGTON STAR

14 August 1967

## China Ship in Italy Bars Ouster—With Operetta

GENOA, Italy (AP) — A Red Chinese freighter asked by Genoa port authorities to leave for displaying political propaganda refused today to budge. Instead the crew put on a political protest operetta, Peking style.

While anxious port officials wondered how to get rid of the 8,076-ton Li Ming, the stern of the ship suddenly blossomed with placards in Chinese and Italian denouncing the leave-port order and accusing authorities of causing "grave, hostile political incidents against the Chinese people."

A moment later, on the cue, the entire 50-man crew mustered on the main deck. They all faced shore and began to chant in unison Chinese phrases from copies of the Mao Tse-tung book each held in hand.

Capt. Ku Fu-shan stopped the collective reading while two sailors lowered a small stern anchor, possibly to symbolize

determination to stay. The reading then resumed for five minutes, and the crew disappeared below decks.

Fifteen minutes later the sailors reappeared and waved the books in a catchy rhythm. One sailor broke out an accordion and played half a dozen tunes. When he finished, a tennis table was set up on deck and several seamen played table tennis.

Nowhere in all the activity was there any effort to get the ship moving.

The Li Ming arrived yesterday carrying a mixed cargo and showing banners over the side hailing Italian-Chinese friendship.

She also displayed a sign with a Mao quotation: "To lift a stone they threw it on their own feet; this is a proverb with which the Chinese people describe the conduct of madmen. Reactionaries in all countries are madmen of this type."

BALTIMORE SUN

5 September 1967

## GENOA LETS CHINA POSTER SHIP UNLOAD

### Red Captain Agrees To Remove All But One Of Disputed Signs

Genoa, Tuesday, Sept. 5 (AP)—Italian and Communist Chinese officials reached an agreement early today on their hassle over the propaganda-bedecked freighter Li Ming, isolated since August 13 in Italy's biggest commercial harbor.

The freighter was to be allowed to unload its cargo later in the day after moving to another pier and taking down all but one of the signs that port officials claimed violated Italian law against spreading foreign propaganda.

The agreement was announced by the ship's captain, Ku Fu-shan, and Lucio Caputo, an official of the Italian International Commerce Institute, after a six-hour meeting.

#### Ends Bitter Deadlock

The settlement ends a bitter deadlock that commercial circles believed might have endangered Italy's growing trade with China.

The Li Ming had been ordered to tear down its signs or leave the harbor. The Chinese refused and reacted with almost daily demonstrations and more posters. The Genoa port authority barred unloading operations, isolated the ship and refused its repeated requests for water.

There had been persistent rumors that a settlement of the case was imminent, and it had appeared that the Italians were eager to move toward one because of commercial and labor pressures.

#### Strike Threatened

Caputo said after announcing the accord that longshoremen had threatened to strike if the 8,000-ton Li Ming was not unloaded. He also noted that Italy's trade with Red China had grown larger than its exchanges with either Britain or the Soviet Union.

He described the agreement as a compromise, but it appeared that the Italians were giving considerably more ground than the Chinese.

He detailed the accord as follows:

The Chinese would move from their present pier to another capable of handling the unloading. On doing so, the Italians would provide the Li Ming with food and water. Thereupon, the Chinese would tear down all their protest and propaganda signs—more than a dozen had been put up—except one quoting Mao Tse-tung in denouncing "reactionaries."

#### Started It All

It was this sign that started all the trouble. The port authority had declared it violated an Italian law prohibiting foreigners from spreading propaganda in Italian territory. Two Communist Chinese ships that docked previously at Venice had run into the same ruling.

Business and Government circles had expressed concern lest the incident over the Li Ming cost Italy the cancellation of trade contracts with the Chinese Communists worth millions of dollars.

While Italy and Red China maintain no diplomatic relations, they have been entertaining a mutually profitable trade.

#### Now "China All Over"

In the first half of this year, Italy sold goods worth \$48,000,000 to the Chinese, an increase of 85 per cent over the corresponding period last year.

"We seldom had a better client," added the trade official, who asked not to be identified.

"Once, Japan was our best customer in the Far East. Now it's China all over the place. Their payments are always punctual, sometimes even in advance of the delivery. They pay in hard currency, usually through some Swiss bank."

WASHINGTON POST  
17 June 1967

(5)

# China Economy Is Damaged By Purge, Maoists Concede

By Stanley Karnow

Washington Post Foreign Service

HONG KONG, June 16—Official Chinese Communist statements are beginning to concede that Mao Tse-tung's tumultuous Cultural Revolution is severely disrupting China's fragile economy, both in the cities and in the countryside.

The tone of alarm in many of these statements seems to reflect concern for the summer rice, wheat and other grain crops, scheduled for harvest soon in north and central China as well as in the rich southwestern province of Szechuan, a particularly turbulent area at present. [Long columns of Red Guards, thousands strong and carrying packs and bedding rolls on their backs, have been marching out of Peking to the harvest fields in the surrounding countryside in the last few days, Reuters reported from Peking.]

## Transportation Difficulties

At the same time, Peking appears to be nettled by transportation difficulties, partly resulting from uncontrollable Red Guard traffic on the railroads, partly because of political strikes by railway workers.

According to reports from Peking today, the Changking Bridge spanning the Yangtse River has been closed following political disorders at Wuhan, the capital of Hupeh Province. Built with Soviet aid, the bridge is a major transport artery in central China.

In contrast to last January,

when alleged "counter-revolutionary" elements were held responsible for economic troubles, much of the blame for the current havoc is being attributed to Mao's own partisans, whose unruly, interne-cine struggles are presumably causing significant damage.

A scene of bitter violence at the moment seems to be Anhui Province, in East China. A provincial radio broadcast heard here today said that fighting in the area is "destroying state property" as well as "threatening the lives of the people."

## Call to the Army

Calling on the Army to restore order, the broadcast also implied that protagonists in the fighting have been looting private homes, shops, public buildings and state granaries.

A similar broadcast from Nanking, the former Chinese Nationalist capital in coastal Kiangsu Province, admonished "revolutionary leaders who, for their own interests, hoodwinked numbers of people into destroying property, pillaging and searching homes."

A Honan Province broadcast monitored here yesterday said that "agricultural production suffered badly" in parts of the province after "counter-revolutionary revisionists incited peasants to leave their fields."

This admission of lagging food output, one of the first of its kind, foreshadows the possibility that Mao's supporters may blame their opponents for poor crops this year. In general, however, China's agricultural prospects seem good.

Meanwhile, an article in Peking's authoritative People's Daily yesterday explained that "enormous amounts of food grain are being wasted" to make glue for pasting up Red Guard wall posters. The article advised youths to use a substance called "yellow mud."

## Trade Affected

To some extent, too, trade has been affected by the revolutionary hysteria. Foreign buyers at the Canton commercial fair last month took a dim view of Chinese handicrafts depicting guerrilla warriors and night soil collectors. A Japanese importer was distressed to discover that the trade mark of a calligraphy brush had been changed from "cranes flocking on the sea" to "long live worker heroes."

The degree to which the Cultural Revolution has hurt the Chinese economy is impossible to estimate with any accuracy. At a meeting in Peking last month, however, Vice Premier Hsieh Fu-chih said that production in the capital dropped by 7 per cent in April as a result of clashes, strikes and sabotage.

It can only be guessed that the damage was worse in Szechuan, an area where factories have reportedly been battlefields in conflicts between rival political groups.

Equally difficult to determine at this stage is the nature of China's economic policy—if, indeed, it has any policy at all beyond hoping to bring in the next harvest.

Much of the criticism directed against Liu Shao-chi, the chief of state, and other sup-

posed foes of Mao has charged them with trying to "restore capitalism" or stimulate Soviet style "revisionism" by, among other things, providing material incentives to workers and peasants as a means of boosting production.

Judging from these criticisms, it might appear that Mao's drive is to unleash another "great leap forward," his reckless attempt in 1958 to modernize China overnight by a massive mobilization of its population.

## 'Decades of Effort'

Recent Peking economic treatises indicate, however, that Mao may be striving for a kind of revolutionary austerity rather than a spectacular vault into the future. Citing Mao, an important People's Daily editorial last month said:

"To make China rich and strong needs several decades of intense effort, which will include, among other things, the effort to practice strict economy and combat waste—in other words, the policy of building up our country through diligence and frugality."

The editorial stressed the need for an eight-hour day, thrifty expenditures and a rationalization of labor. It also called for "normal, revolutionary order."

The task of restoring "revolutionary order" amid China's present convulsions has been handed to the Army. What the troops can or will do is questionable, however.

In an editorial this morning, the Liberation Army Daily hinted that a campaign is brewing to "rectify mistakes" in the Army. If carried out, a military purge could further splinter an Army that is, from all accounts, fragmented in its political, regional and personal loyalties.

WASHINGTON POST  
28 August 1967

# China Turning Criticism to Cambodia

By Stanley Karnow

Washington Post Foreign Service

HONG KONG, Aug. 27 —

Though he has consistently praised Communist China as his "Number One friend," Cambodia's Chief of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, may be next on the growing list of world leaders to draw open attacks from Peking.

This potential development is discernible in the subtle, yet significant, criticism currently being directed against Sihanouk in a secret newsletter distributed to selected Communist officials in the Chinese capital.

At the same time, both Peking sources and analysts here detected an altered Chinese approach to Cambodia in the relatively cool treatment accorded Cambodian Foreign Minister Norodom Phurissara, who visited China early this month.

It is believed that Peking's displeasure with Sihanouk stems partly from the Cambodian ruler's recent trend toward closer ties with the Soviet Union, and partly from his efforts to curb the leftist activities of overseas Chinese inside his country.

Peking also appears to take a dim view of Sihanouk's recent crackdowns on Communist guerrillas in Cambodia as well as his expressed desire to settle his long-standing disputes with Thailand, which the Chinese consider a U.S. satellite.

Just as its policy toward neutralist Burma has changed from amity to hatred, so Peking's past tolerance of Cambodian nonalignment seems to be waning under the pressure of Communist leader Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution.

Signs of Peking's increasing dissatisfaction with Cambodia have been reflected in the Tsan-kao Hsiao-hsi (Reference Information) a classified newsletter for senior Communist cadres and other politically reliable Chinese. Copies of the newsletter have just been received by this correspondent from reliable sources in China's capital.

Produced by the official

Western wire service dispatches, American and European newspaper articles and other non-Communist information. Its political slant is evident from its choice of material and its comments accompanying the material.

The newsletter's recent comments on Cambodia plainly indicate Peking's irritation. An issue last month, for example, quoted a letter by Sihanouk

thanking Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for Russia's decision to recognize Cambodia's frontiers and territorial integrity.

The headline over the item, clearly loaded with meaning for Chinese Communists, read: "Prince Sihanouk praises Soviet revisionists' recognition of Cambodian borders as having 'special significance.'"

Similarly, reprinting Reuters and French News Agency dispatches describing Sihanouk's criticism of pro-Communist Cambodian publications, the newsletter headlined: "Slanders progressive newspapers."

Among the newspapers criticized by Sihanouk was Soriya, one of the five Chinese journals in the country. The Chinese Communist Embassy in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, controls all the Chinese journals.

Judging from the Tsan-kao Hsiao-hsi, a subject of special concern for Peking is Sihanouk's treatment of Cambodia's estimated 400,000 overseas Chinese. Within recent months, Cambodia has laid down strict rules aimed at curbing Red China's propa-

ganda activities, particularly in Chinese schools in Cambodia.

A Ministry of Education directive in June ordered, among other regulations, that textbooks be supervised and that the Cambodian language be taught in all foreign-run private schools. Failure to obey, the directive said, could result in expulsion from Cambodia.

The directive followed an open letter issued by China's embassy in Phnom Penh asserting that it was the "sacred right" of all Chinese to read

Mao badges. Only by respecting Mao, the letter added, could overseas Chinese seriously pursue "the political friendship of the Chinese government towards Cambodia."

The Chinese Embassy letter, along with other Chinese conduct, drew fire from the Cambodian press, including newspapers operated under Sihanouk's personal direction or inspiration.

The Tsan-kao Hsiao-hsi reprinted these critical Cambodian articles. Peking's official opinion, however, was mirrored in the newsletter's comments. One, for example, read: "Cambodian newspapers shout that overseas Chinese should not participate in propaganda and 'subversive' activities."

The newsletter also featured Cambodian newspaper items on the alleged misbehavior of Chinese technicians in Cambodia, ironically noting as well the charges that they "carry on subversion" in the country.

These understated comments have been matched for subtlety by the mild reception given Cambodian Foreign

minister Phurissara in Peking this month.

Though toasted by Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, Phurissara did not meet Mao, who, however, accorded an audience to a minor delegation from Albania at the time.

In 1965, moreover, when relations between China and Cambodia were warmer, Mao displayed Sihanouk at the Chinese National Day celebrations and later received Gen. Lon Nol, the Cambodian Minister of Defense.

The subtle, esoteric methods of communication employed by the Chinese Communists in the Tsan-kao Hsiao-hsi was the subject of a study last year in the China Quarterly by Henry G. Schwarz of the University of Washington.

Using early 1960 copies of the newsletter, Schwarz disson the alleged misbehavior of covered that Peking officials were alerted to the imminence of the Sino-Soviet dispute when the amount of information they were given about internal Soviet events dropped sharply.

HINDUSTAN TIMES  
1 September 1967

# Mao Attempts to Rule the Waves

Hong Kong:

Special to the Hindustan Times

IN Peking, Chairman Mao Tse-tung is honoured in both slogan and song as the "Great Helmsman." At one time this was considered but a figure of speech—a tribute to Mao and his thoughts as the guide to the ship of State. More recently, the Chinese have been giving the title a more literal interpretation.

Mao's thoughts are to be used to rule the waves; the Great Helmsman is to guide all ships in all ports, regardless of registration and nationality. And woe to those who disagree.

The campaign of this Chinese Neptune is a three-pronged affair. One part involves foreign ships visiting Chinese ports, another concerns ships at sea, and the third guides Chinese ships travelling to foreign ports.

Foreign vessels calling at Chinese ports have felt the most violent brunt of Peking's effort to put the Great Helmsman in charge. Seamen aboard these ships are expected to pay obsequious homage to Chairman Mao, to honour his portrait as that of a deity, and to wear badges bearing his portrait. Merchant marine captains are to allow their ships to be turned into floating propaganda exhibits, plastered with Mao slogans and quotations and anti-foreign declarations.

## Russian Threat

Those who refuse are sometimes beaten and imprisoned. Their ships are held up and Red Guards swarm aboard with red paint to smear on the propaganda. The Red Guards even feel that foreign seamen should rejoice at seeing their own countries condemned and denounced in these painted pronouncements.

This maritime slop-over of the Cultural Revolution is being intensified, but it actually began a year ago. One of the more extreme and recent incidents was that of the Soviet ship *Svirsk* at Dairen. It began when the crew refused to be indoctrinated with Maoism, and a crewman threw a Mao badge overboard. The captain was arrested, beaten and publicly taunted. Three sailors were pulled from the ship. Red Guards stormed aboard, smashed equipment and plastered anti-Soviet slogans all over the ship. Russia threatened to sever trade relations with China, and China instigated a new series of demonstrations in front of the Soviet Embassy in Peking.

It was also a Russian merchantman, the *AMURSK*, which was the first to be subjected to harassment in a Chinese port. It ran foul of the Chinese almost a

year ago over a supposed insult, and the Chinese demanded that the captain recognize the thoughts of Chairman Mao and condemn revisionism.

Late last year, another Soviet merchantman, the *Zagorsk*, was held for 20 days in Dairen following another incident, and the captain was banned for life from ever sailing to a Chinese port again.

A Norwegian ship which regularly plies between South China and Malaysia, always leaves China festooned with the Mao slogans—which are removed by Malaysian police at the other end of the run.

## Sailors Assaulted

British ships have encountered more trouble than any other nationality. To list just a few—five officers of the British vessel *Eastern Moon* were imprisoned in Shanghai for various periods following an alleged insult incident to Chairman Mao. Two members of the s.s. *Lord Gladstone* were arrested in Dairen on similar charges. An officer of the British freighter *Riley* spent 18 days in solitary confinement in the same port following another such incident, and later, in Vancouver, 11 crew members refused to sail with the ship back to China.

On July 22, Peking published a protest claiming that British merchant seamen had insulted Chairman Mao on no less than seven occasions while in Chinese ports over a period of 10 weeks. The offences, the Chinese said, had occurred in Dairen, Shanghai, Whampoa and Chingwantao.

A Greek freighter, the *Cape Vamvakos*, was attacked by Red Guards in Shanghai on August 4 after an officer had ordered stevedores to be careful in handling cargo lest the ship's deck be damaged. The Chief Officer was thrown down a ladder and his head was stamped on by about 20 Red Guards. The Red Guards pummelled the wife of the Captain, Ioannis Gorso, and then forced him to bow before a book of Mao quotations and sign a statement absolving the Red Guards of violence.

## Indiscipline

Later the freighter called at Inchon, Korea, where the captain said he would not take his ship back to China even though Dairen was the next port of call.

On the high seas foreign ships using Chinese crews have been subjected to another type of harassment. The crewmen neglect their duties while taking time for

the study of Mao's thoughts and recitations of his quotations. Officers who demand discipline are accused of being anti-Mao, and are subjected to abuse bordering on mutiny. Since these ships regularly call at Chinese ports, the Peking authorities are able to exert a great deal of pressure.

Officers of both British and Dutch vessels have been forced to issue apologies. One Dutch line was even forced to publish an apology in the Hong Kong Press, after the apology had been signed at a ceremony dominated by a portrait of Chairman Mao. A number of foreign merchant officers have resigned rather than be subjected to any further such abuse.

Early this year an Italian shipping line sacked an entire Chinese crew while their ship was in a European port because of political troubles with the seamen.

The Italians more recently have been the chief target of the third phase of this maritime Cultural Revolution. Four different Chinese ships have tried to work cargo in Italian ports while plastered with political slogans and Mao quotations. Objections from the Italians have spurred the Chinese to add anti-Italian slogans along with the others. In reporting the events, Peking declares that the propagation of Mao's thoughts on Chinese ships in foreign ports "is not to be interfered with by anyone under any pretext."

## Major Chaos

Red Guards in Peking later seized the head of an Italian commercial office and subjected him to a public trial on the streets for the incidents in Italy.

Slogan-bearing Chinese ships sail into Hong Kong harbour regularly and work cargo (even though the Chinese claim they are abiding by a supposed Communist strike in Hong Kong) while loud-speakers on the ships blare forth with propaganda. Marine police do not interfere unless the propaganda is anti-British. Ships of other nationalities returning to Hong Kong from Chinese ports are asked to remove anti-British slogans before entering the harbour.

The most recent country to fall victim to China's new maritime practices has been Ceylon. The Ceylon Embassy in Peking has been the target of demonstrations following an incident in Colombo, when a Chinese-chartered ship was searched and a quantity of Maoist propaganda was destroyed.

The Chinese Embassy in Ceylon originally blamed the Ceylonese police but a later official protest Note from Peking claimed the crime was committed by ruffians with police collusion.

The Cultural Revolution in China has caused other problems for shipping as well. Transportation and labour upsets in Chinese ports along with the time being taken off work by stevedores to attend political meetings has caused major chaos. In late July, 100 ships were waiting to be unloaded in Shanghai harbour and 30 were anchored outside the harbour. Some ships have been held up in port for as long as 54 days. Marine authorities in Hong Kong say they have known of several ships that have by-passed Chinese ports and at least one shipping company has stopped sailing to China altogether.

50X1-HUM

**Page Denied**

Next 16 Page(s) In Document Denied

Est et Ouest (East and West)  
Vol. 19, No. 385, Paris.  
15 June 1967

## THE CUBANS IN BLACK AFRICA

by Nicholas Lang

Cuban penetration into Black Africa -- more recent and less well-known than the activities of the Soviets and the Chinese -- has already aroused serious concern in many African states. They are in Congo (Brazzaville), where they saved the "revolutionary regime" a year ago, in Guinea, where they are protecting Sekou Toure, and in Tanzania, where they are serving as instructors in training camps for guerrillas. Many hundreds of Cuban soldiers and "advisers" are participating, sometimes personally, as in Congo (Kinshasa), in subversive operations launched here and there all across the African continent. These operations are directed mostly at the moderate governments that the agents of Fidel Castro would like to eliminate so that they may be replaced by revolutionary groups with some of their leaders previously trained in the political schools of Havana and the Sierra Maestra.

Since the first Tri-Continental Conference, held in Havana in January 1966, the Cuban presence in Africa has continually grown. As a result of this conference, it was decided that a "Liberation Committee" should be formed, with the official aim of "supplying all the moral, political and material support necessary for the national liberation movements, and giving practical effectiveness to the fundamental aims of the Organization for Afro-Asiatic and Latin-American Solidarity." Set up in Havana, this "Liberation Committee" is actually intended to encourage by all the necessary means (weapons, explosives, propaganda material, etc.) the development of "revolutionary" activities inspired and supported by the Communists in the countries of the third world, especially Black Africa.

The activities of the Cubans in Africa are therefore essentially of a political nature, not to say subversive. The economic aid given by the government of Fidel Castro, very meager in any case, only covers the revolutionary aims of the Cuban agents. In any case, it is very surprising that the government of a country like Cuba, with widely known domestic difficulties, mostly economic, should devote large sums of money to bring subversion to a continent with, at first sight, no particular interest for the Cuban nation. This is, however, actually a sort of division of labor among the Communists. As long as the Soviets wish to give an aspect that might be termed "reassuring" to their penetration into Africa, it is necessary, given the rivalry with China, that another "socialist" state should take over the responsibility, and even unpopularity in the eyes of African moderates, for subversive activities. All the evidence points to the probability that it is the Soviets who, directly or indirectly, are supplying the means to Fidel Castro to carry on these activities, for which the revolutionary temperament of the Cuban leader makes him perfectly fitted. This does not mean that he does not profit from the opportunity to play his own role.

(Cont.)



From Moshi to Havana

It was at the Third Conference of the "Organization for the Solidarity of the Afro-Asian Peoples," held in February 1963 at Moshi (Tanzania), that Cuba made a noticeable entry into the African continent. One of the essential aspects of this conference was the extension of the Organization to include Latin America. In the reports published as a result of the conference, frequent mention was made of the "solidarity of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America." One of the paragraphs of the final statement was actually devoted entirely to Latin American problems, in that it stated that the Conference "strongly supports the battle of the peoples of Latin America against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism, and especially the Cuban people battling against the military aggression and economic blockade by U.S. imperialists, and supports the five-point demand of the Prime Minister, Dr. Fidel Castro."

At Moshi it was decided that a permanent office, made up of six African representatives, should be set up to prepare the procedural details of the extension of the OSPAA [Organisation de Solidarite des Peuples Afro-Asiatiques; Organization for the Solidarity of the Afro-Asian Peoples] to the "peoples" of Latin America. The Cuban government then proposed that the next conference of the OSPAA, enlarged to include Latin America, should be held in Havana. This conference, greatly hoped for by Fidel Castro and the Soviets, took place from 3 to 10 January 1966 in the Cuban capital. The evidence indicates, for various reasons, but mostly in opposition to Chinese activities in the third world, that the Soviets wanted to encourage a sort of wide movement of revolutionary solidarity that would encompass the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Although the role of Cuba in the Asian continent was practically nil, this was not the case in Africa, the continent of the distant ancestors of Cuban negroes.

In the course of two press conferences given successively in Havana and at Prague, the Moroccan leader Ben Barka, president of the "Committee on Preparations" for the next tri-continental conference (and whose disappearance, incidentally, has intrigued the whole world), gave interesting information on the spirit of the coming conference: "This conference, which will bring together revolutionary organizations, is a historic event, given its composition, for there will be represented the two currents of world revolution: the current rising with the socialist October revolution, and that of the national liberation revolution."

Thus, by grouping the Russian Bolshevik revolution and the decolonization movement, Ben Barka gave his support to principles often expressed by the Communists. The Moroccan leader made his thoughts clearer by saying: "This conference will be historical since it is to be held in Latin America, where the battle against colonialism and neo-colonialism has been going on for more than fifty years, and it will be all the more historic since Cuba will be its seat. Cuba is a country that is an example of the fusion of the two currents, a country that first of all had a national liberation revolution and now is building its socialist revolution."

For Africans, or at least for "revolutionaries," Cuba has thus become a beacon for this "revolution," which the Soviets, with the aid of Fidel Castro, are trying to extend over all their continent.

#### Che Guevara in Africa

At present, Cuba exchanges ambassadors with the following African countries: Algeria, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Tanzania and the United Arab Republic. Relations, in principle, have been established with Dahomey, Liberia and Libya. Finally, Cuba was also present in Ghana until the fall of Nkrumah. Today the Cuban diplomats, who never stopped "meddling" in the domestic affairs of Ghana, have been expelled, and relations between the two countries broken off.

To emphasize the interest that Cuba has in African affairs, Mr. Dorticos, President of the Cuban Republic, made an official visit, during 1964, to the countries with which Havana has diplomatic relations. In December of the same year, and in January 1965, it was the turn of Che Guevara, then Minister of Industry and Castro's right-hand man, to go to Africa. When one knows about the revolutionary past of Guevara, one well may think that Castro's companion would not go to Africa to talk about economic or cultural exchanges, but rather to prepare new centers of agitation. A year before, in January 1964, at the time of the coup in Zanzibar, some dozens of Africans, led by Okello, had returned to the "Isle of Cloves" to take part in the insurrection. Winning in Zanzibar, these agitators trained in Havana tried to repeat their coup in Tanganyika, in Kenya and in Uganda. The operation failed when local governments called in British troops.

Che Guevara visited Algeria, then governed by Ben Bella, then Mali, Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville) and Ghana. Africa had just lived through the bloody drama of Stanleyville, and the Congolese problem was the central preoccupation of all. As soon as he arrived in Algiers -- "To understand Africa," he declared, "one must begin at Algiers" -- Guevara stated that the Congo problem should be resolved, not only with UN aid, but with "the cooperation of all the progressive peoples of the world." He added that it was not necessary "to export revolution, but practical support must be given to all revolutionary movements... There is in Africa a more powerful revolutionary ferment than is thought... The liberation battle must be converted into an offensive against imperialism... Peaceful coexistence between exploiters and exploited is impossible...."

Throughout his peregrination Guevara kept repeating his slogans, which could not but arouse uneasiness in the moderate African countries. Apparently it was at Accra, where he delivered a personal message from Castro to Nkrumah, that Guevara planned with the Ghanaian leaders the possibility of sending to Africa MIGs piloted by Cubans, intended to intervene on the side of the rebels in the Congo. At Brazzaville, he had long discussions with the leaders of the "nationalist" movements in

Portuguese Africa, especially with Agostinho Neto, president of the MPLA [Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola; Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola], Amilcar Cabral, leader of the PAIGC [Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde: African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde], and the heads of the FRELIMO [Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique; Mozambique Liberation Front]. It was decided that these movements should send a certain number of their militants to be given military and political instruction in Havana.

At the same time as Guevara was in Africa, three Congolese rebel leaders arrived in Cuba. These were Johnston Umba, representative of the "National Liberation Council" in East Africa, Robert Saidi, secretary of the "Ministry of Information," and Placide Kotongwa, "office manager for the Minister of Defense." All three came to ask increased aid from Fidel Castro, and the possibility of sending to Cuba young Congolese to be trained in the art of guerrilla warfare.

The request was taken under consideration since, some months later (June 1965), two Cubans were killed in an ambush near Bendera, in Maniema province. According to documents found on their bodies, they were two agents from Castro, one named Sadiz Gerez Gomez, both charged with "serving as advisers" to the rebel cause in the Congo. They had arrived at Dar es Salaam via Moscow and Prague, and had taken part in military operations in the neighborhood of Lake Tanganyika. It appeared from these documents that other Cuban "advisers" were in the rebel ranks.

#### Revelations of a Former Ambassador of Castro

The activities of the Cuban government in Africa were confirmed, in the summer of 1966, by the revelations of a former Cuban diplomat who chose liberty.

Dr. Leonel Alonso was no newcomer to Cuban politics. As a student, he had been imprisoned by Batista. Then he lived in exile in Mexico in 1956 and 1957, at the same time as Castro, with whom he returned to Cuba. After the victory of the revolutionaries, he was charged with Asian and African affairs. He filled diplomatic posts, and then in Ghana, where he was posted in 1961 and 1962, before becoming charge d'affaires in Indonesia, then in Syria and in Lebanon. He accompanied Guevara on his African peregrinations. He represented Cuba at the Afro-Asian conference at Algiers in 1965, and he took part in the tri-continental conference in Havana in January 1966.

According to him, Castro is interested in Africa and has been supporting revolutionary agitation there since 1961. In any case, Dr. Alonso was, according to his statements, "at the very center of the subversion campaign in Africa" from the time of his arrival in Ghana in 1961.

Three negro Cuban officers presented themselves to him when he had just arrived in Accra. They were provided with false passports and did not conceal the fact that they felt their mission to be of the highest

importance. They kept in direct contact with Havana by means of the embassy teletype, but using a secret code. They were received by Nkrumah and the Soviet ambassador, and they stayed four months in Ghana. They had time to organize (with lower-ranking Cubans) a camp for the training of "fighters for liberation" at the border with Upper Volta. This center was in operation until the fall of Nkrumah. According to Dr. Alonso, these "fighters" were intended to carry the revolution to Upper Volta, Niger, Cameroon, Togo, Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville.

The fall of Nkrumah in February 1966 did not put an end to Castro's interest in Ghana. When the new Ghanaian government closed the Cuban embassy at Accra on 27 September 1966 (perhaps as a result of Dr. Alonso's revelations), it claimed to have proof that the Cuban authorities were contributing to the training of 2,000 Ghanaian guerrillas, in Cuba as well as in Ghana.

We shall see later that the Cubans, expelled from Ghana, fell back on Congo (Brazzaville), but it should be noted, still according to Dr. Alonso, that there were other centers of Cuban activity in Africa.

In 1963, during the frontier dispute between Algeria and Morocco, Castro put three or four hundred regular soldiers at the disposal of the Algerian government, then led by Ben Bella. He thought that the operation would result in the fall of the royal house, and that it would bring Ben Barka to power.

Dr. Alonso, in 1965, met at the Algiers conference Pablo Rivalta, whom he had met in Accra in 1961 and who had just been named Cuban ambassador to Tanzania. The mission he had been entrusted with was directed against Kenya. He was to work for the overthrow of Kenyatta in favor of Oginga Odinga, with the help of revolutionaries from Zanzibar. We have already seen how agitators trained in Havana played a big role in the Zanzibar revolution in January 1964.

Castro is closely interested in the civil war activities going on in the Portuguese colonies. According to Dr. Alonso, he recently increased his aid to the African Independence Party of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde, which he considers to be the best organized in Africa. In January 1966, the secretary general of this party, Amilcar Cabral, went to Havana to take part in the tri-continental conference. He had long discussions with Castro who later gave him "significant financial aid."<sup>1</sup>

#### The Cubans in Congo (Brazzaville)

The Cubans only became interested in Congo (Brazzaville) after the coup that overthrew Nkrumah and chased them out of Ghana. Six months

<sup>1</sup>On 28 February 1965, Le Monde [Paris] reprinted a Reuters dispatch according to which Portuguese troops took and destroyed in Guinea a rebel camp containing foreign mercenaries believed to be Cubans. According to the communique from the Portuguese command, the mercenaries were described as "swarthy Cubans."

earlier, in July 1965, the Cuban ambassador to Algiers, Jorge Serguera Riveri, came to Brazzaville to stay. After 19 June 1965, Castro publicly supported Ben Bella against Colonel Boumediene who had just overthrown him. There followed a chill in the diplomatic relations between the two countries, and after that time the Cuban government had only a charge d'affaires in Algiers. Serguera was available, and, transferred to Brazzaville, he played a prime role in the Cuban entry into the Congo.<sup>1</sup>

In January 1966 the two governments signed an agreement that allowed several hundred Congolese students of medicine and agriculture to go to Cuba, while Cubans could come to teach at the National Congolese Agricultural and Construction. (It is said that the Cubans have high hopes for this Angolan half-caste from Bacongo, for whom they are saving the government of Angola when the latter becomes "liberated.")

What was not known then was that at the same time several hundreds of Cuban militiamen were coming to the Congo. Their mission was double (at least). They were in charge of the military instruction of the national civil defence corps (a militia to supplant the police and the army, not considered reliable), and guarding the president of the Republic.

This presence was revealed, and its two roles, on 27 June 1966 and the days that followed.

On 27 June there was a mutiny within the Congolese army. The pretext was the arbitrary demotion of an officer. In fact, the revolting military men were protesting the progressive putting of the army under Party control. On 23 June the government had voted on a law transforming the Congolese armed forces into a "popular national army." The mutineers demanded the renunciation of this "democratization" of the army and the departure of Cuban military instructors.

The mutiny would certainly have resulted in the overthrow of the government (especially since the president of the Republic, Massemba-Debat was in Tananarive) if the Cubans had not intervened.

They saved the situation. The prime minister, Ambroise Noumazalay admitted this clearly on 1 July: "If our Cuban comrades had not influenced the people, we would not be here today. This is why the presence of our Cuban brothers has aroused opposition. I assure you that they will not leave... The Cuban brother instructors will continue to instruct

---

<sup>1</sup>The decision to establish diplomatic relations between Havana and Brazzaville was reached in May 1964. On 29 March 1967, the Algerian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bouteflika, received an envoy from the Cuban government, Mr. Aliares, director of the Africa-Middle East division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This visit seems to indicate a normalizing of relations between the two countries.

the people, for an unarmed people is a people of slaves."

On its side, the Cuban government, through the party newspaper Granma, assured: "The government of Havana, fulfilling its international duties, has sent arms and instructors to help in the training of the people of Congo (Brazzaville). This aid has been sent by Cuba at the request of Congo (Brazzaville) to organize and train militiamen and armed personnel in this country, in view of the imperialist threats from Congo (Leopoldville)."

According to Dr. Alonso, the group of Cuban mercenaries in the Congo is under the command of Captain Terry Thorndike, one of the three Cuban officers he received at Accra when he was posted to Ghana.

It seems that the Cubans in the Congo have other missions than those that concern the Congo alone. As in Ghana, they are preparing agitators and guerrillas for the neighboring countries. We have seen that, according to some information, they are counting on Claude da Silva to rule Angola some day. They seem especially interested in the Cabinda enclave.

#### The Cubans in Guinea

Guinea is also a Cuban base in Africa.

Cubans are present there under three guises.

"Sekou Toure's mistrust of many high-ranking military men has grown, and the presidential guard is now made up of Cuban mercenaries," reported the correspondent of Le Monde [Paris] at Dakar on 9 October 1966.

On 15 December 1966 we read in Afrique Nouvelle [New Africa] that in Guinea, "Castro's Cubans have begun, since 3 December (1966), to train militiamen of both sexes. Each section consists of seven young people, and there are twenty-seven sections."

Finally, at Masenta, in Guinea, the Cubans are helping to form a sort of revolutionary expeditionary force, made up of Ghanaians, whose task will be to return Nkrumah to power. According to Dr. Alonso, Serguera visited Nkrumah in Guinea, and offered him not only the services of the Cuban legion based in Congo (Brazzaville), but also those of a Cuban sabotage specialist, trained in the USSR, a certain Jose Simon, whom he had already met at Algiers. This latter had the idea of blowing up the Volta Dam in order to cause panic among the Ghanaian people that would provide a favorable opportunity for revolutionary action to return Nkrumah to power.

EST & OUEST  
1-15 JUNE 1967

## Les Cubains en Afrique noire

### DE MOSHI A LA HAVANE

PLUS récente et moins connue que l'action des Soviétiques et des Chinois, la pénétration cubaine en Afrique noire suscite déjà de vives inquiétudes dans de nombreux États africains. Présents au Congo-Brazzaville, dont ils sauvèrent le « régime révolutionnaire » voici un an, en Guinée, où ils assurent la protection de Sékou Touré, en Tanzanie, où ils servent d'instructeurs dans des camps de formation pour guérilleros, plusieurs centaines de militaires et de « conseillers » cubains participent, parfois personnellement comme ce fut le cas au Congo-Kinshasa, à des opérations subversives déclenchées ici et là à travers le continent africain. Opérations qui visent d'ailleurs surtout les gouvernements modérés que les agents de Fidel Castro veulent éliminer pour les remplacer par des équipes révolutionnaires dont certains dirigeants ont été préalablement instruits dans les écoles politiques de La Havane et de la Sierra Maestra.

Depuis la première Conférence Tricontinentale, tenue à La Havane en janvier 1966, la présence cubaine en Afrique n'a fait que s'intensifier. C'est à l'issue de cette conférence qu'il fut décidé de créer un « Comité de Libération » dont le but officiel est de « fournir tout le soutien moral, politique et matériel nécessaire aux mouvements nationaux de libération et de donner une efficacité pratique aux objectifs fondamentaux de l'Organisation de solidarité afro-asiatique et latino-américaine ». Installé à La Havane, ce « Comité de Libération » est, en réalité, chargé de favoriser grâce à tous les moyens indispensables (armes, explosifs, matériel de propagande, etc.), le développement de l'action « révolutionnaire », inspirée et soutenue par les communistes, dans les pays du tiers monde, particulièrement en Afrique noire.

L'action des Cubains en Afrique est donc essentiellement de caractère politique, pour ne pas dire subversif. L'aide économique du gouvernement de Fidel Castro, par ailleurs fort mince, ne sert, en vérité, qu'à couvrir les objectifs révolutionnaires des agents cubains. On pourrait d'ailleurs s'étonner que le gouvernement d'un pays tel que Cuba, dont les difficultés intérieures notamment économiques sont bien connues, emploie des fonds très importants pour porter la subversion dans un continent où, à première vue, la nation cubaine n'est pas directement intéressée. En réalité, on se trouve en présence d'une sorte de division du travail des communistes. Au fur et à mesure que les Soviétiques veulent donner un aspect, que l'on peut qualifier de « rassurant » à leur pénétration en Afrique, il est indispensable, compte tenu de la rivalité chinoise, qu'un autre pays « socialiste » prenne la responsabilité et même l'impopularité aux yeux des Africains modérés, de l'action subversive. Tout donne à

penser que ce sont les Soviétiques qui, directement ou indirectement, fournissent à Fidel Castro les moyens nécessaires pour mener cette action, à laquelle d'ailleurs le tempérament révolutionnaire du leader cubain s'accorde parfaitement. Et rien ne dit qu'il ne profite pas de l'occasion pour jouer son rôle personnel.

C'est avec la 3<sup>e</sup> Conférence de l'« Organisation de Solidarité des Peuples Afro-Asiatiques », réunie en février 1963 à Moshi (Tanzanie), que Cuba a fait une entrée remarquée sur le continent africain. Un des aspects essentiels de cette conférence fut d'ailleurs l'extension à l'Amérique latine de l'O.S.P.A.A. Dans les textes publiés à l'issue de la conférence, il fut fait mention à diverses reprises de « la solidarité des peuples d'Afrique, d'Asie et d'Amérique latine ». L'un des paragraphes de la déclaration finale fut d'ailleurs entièrement consacré aux problèmes latino-américains puisqu'il précisait que la Conférence « appuie fermement la lutte des peuples d'Amérique latine contre l'impérialisme, le colonialisme et le néo-colonialisme, et particulièrement le peuple cubain luttant contre les agressions militaires et le blocus économique des impérialistes U.S., et soutient la demande en cinq points du Premier ministre, le docteur Fidel Castro ».

Il fut décidé à Moshi qu'un bureau permanent composé de six représentants africains, six asiatiques et six latino-américains, serait constitué pour préparer les modalités de l'extension de l'O.S.P.A.A. aux « peuples » de l'Amérique latine. Le gouvernement cubain proposa d'ailleurs que la prochaine conférence de l'O.S.P.A.A., élargie à l'Amérique latine, soit réunie à La Havane. C'est cette conférence, vivement souhaitée par Fidel Castro et les Soviétiques, qui eut lieu du 3 au 10 janvier 1966 dans la capitale cubaine. De toute évidence, pour des raisons diverses, mais notamment pour contrer l'activité des Chinois dans le tiers monde, les Soviétiques voulaient susciter une sorte de vaste mouvement de solidarité révolutionnaire qui engloberait les pays d'Afrique, d'Asie et d'Amérique latine. Si sur le continent asiatique, le rôle de Cuba était pratiquement nul, il n'en était pas de même en Afrique, continent dont étaient originaires les lointains ancêtres de Cubains noirs.

Au cours de deux conférences de presse données successivement à La Havane et à Prague, le leader marocain Ben Barka, président du « Comité préparatoire » de la future conférence tricontinentale, dont la disparition a intrigué le monde entier, avait donné des précisions intéressantes sur l'esprit de la prochaine réunion : « Cette conférence qui rassemblera les organisations révolutionnaires, est un événement historique par sa composition car y seront représentés les deux courants de la révolution mondiale : le courant qui a surgi

*avec la révolution socialiste d'octobre et celui de la révolution nationale libératrice ».*

En amalgamant ainsi la révolution bolchévique russe et le mouvement de décolonisation, Ben Barka reprenait à son compte des principes maintes fois exprimés par les communistes. Le dirigeant marocain devait d'ailleurs préciser sa pensée en affirmant : « Cette conférence sera historique étant donné qu'elle se tiendra en Amérique latine, où la lutte contre le colonialisme et le néo-colonialisme existe depuis plus de cinquante ans et elle sera d'autant plus historique que Cuba en sera le siège. Cuba, c'est-à-dire un pays qui est l'exemple de la fusion des deux courants, un pays qui a connu tout d'abord la révolution nationale libératrice et qui maintenant construit sa révolution socialiste ».

Pour les Africains, tout au moins pour les « révolutionnaires », Cuba devenait ainsi le phare de cette « révolution » que les Soviétiques, avec l'aide de Fidel Castro, cherchent à étendre à l'ensemble de leur continent.

### « CHE » GUEVARA EN AFRIQUE

A l'heure actuelle, Cuba a échangé des ambassadeurs avec les pays africains suivants : Algérie, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinée, Mali, Maroc, Tanzanie et République Arabe Unie. Des relations, en principe, ont été également établies avec le Dahomey, le Libéria et la Libye. Enfin, Cuba était aussi présent au Ghana jusqu'à la chute de N'Krumah. Aujourd'hui, les diplomates cubains, qui n'avaient cessé de « s'immiscer » dans les affaires intérieures du Ghana ont été expulsés et les relations entre les deux pays ont été rompues.

Pour bien marquer l'intérêt que portait Cuba aux affaires africaines, M. Dorticos, président de la République cubaine, effectua une visite officielle, au courant de 1964, dans les pays avec lesquels La Havane entretenait des relations diplomatiques. En décembre de la même année et en janvier 1965, ce fut le tour de « Che » Guevara, à l'époque ministre de l'Industrie et bras droit de Castro, à se rendre en Afrique. Lorsqu'on connaît le passé révolutionnaire de Guevara, on peut penser que le compagnon de Castro n'alla pas en Afrique pour parler d'échanges économiques ou culturels, mais bien pour y préparer de nouveaux centres d'agitation. Un an plus tôt, en janvier 1964, lors du coup d'Etat de Zanzibar, quelques dizaines d'Africains, dirigés par Okello, étaient revenus dans l'« Ile de Girofle » pour participer à l'insurrection. Vainqueurs à Zanzibar, ces agitateurs formés à La Havane avaient tenté de répéter leur coup au Tanganyika, au Kenya et en Ouganda. L'opération avait échoué, les gouvernements locaux ayant fait appel aux troupes britanniques.

« Che » Guevara visita l'Algérie, alors gouvernée par Ben Bella, puis le Mali, le Congo-Brazzaville, la Guinée et le Ghana. L'Afrique venait de vivre le drame sanglant de Stanleyville et le problème congolais était au centre de toutes les préoccupations. Dès son arrivée à Alger — « Pour comprendre l'Afrique, devait-il déclarer, il faut d'abord se rendre

à Alger » — Guevara affirma que le problème du Congo devait être résolu, non seulement avec l'aide de l'O.U.A. mais « avec le concours de tous les peuples progressistes du monde ». Il n'est pas nécessaire, ajouta-t-il, « d'exporter la révolution, mais il faut donner un soutien pratique à tous les mouvements révolutionnaires... Il y a en Afrique un ferment révolutionnaire plus puissant qu'on ne l'imagine... La lutte de libération doit se transformer en offensive contre l'impérialisme... La coexistence pacifique entre exploités et exploités est impossible... »

Tout au long de son périple, Guevara allait reprendre ses slogans qui ne manquèrent pas de soulever l'inquiétude dans les pays africains modérés. C'est à Accra, semble-t-il, où il remit un message personnel de Castro à N'Krumah, que Guevara envisagea avec les responsables ghanéens l'éventualité d'envoyer en Afrique des appareils « MIG », pilotés par des Cubains, chargés d'intervenir en faveur des rebelles au Congo. A Brazzaville, il eut de longs entretiens avec les dirigeants des mouvements « nationalistes » de l'Afrique portugaise, notamment avec Agostinho Neto, président du M.P.L.A., Amílcar Cabral, leader du P.A.I.G.C. (Guinée portugaise) et les chefs du F.R.E.L.I. M.O. (Mozambique). Il fut décidé que ces mouvements enverraient un certain nombre de leurs militants pour être instruits militairement et politiquement à La Havane.

Au moment même où Guevara se trouvait en Afrique, trois dirigeants rebelles congolais arrivaient à Cuba. Il s'agissait de Johnston Umbo, représentant du « Conseil National de Libération » en Afrique orientale, de Robert Saidi, secrétaire du « Ministère de l'Information », et de Placide Kotongwa, « chef de cabinet du ministre de la Défense ». Tous trois venaient demander une aide accrue à Fidel Castro et la possibilité d'envoyer à Cuba de jeunes Congolais pour y être formés à l'art de la guérilla.

La demande fut prise en considération puisque, quelques mois plus tard (juin 1965), deux Cubains étaient tués dans une embuscade près de Benders dans la province du Maniéma. D'après les documents saisis sur leurs cadavres, il s'avérait qu'il s'agissait de deux agents de Castro, l'un s'appelant Sadiz Gerez Gomez, chargé de servir de « conseillers » à l'entreprise des rebelles au Congo. Ils étaient arrivés à Dar-es-Salam, via Moscou et Prague, et avaient participé à des opérations militaires dans la région du lac Tanganyika. Il ressortait de ces documents que d'autres « conseillers » cubains se trouvaient également dans les rangs des groupes rebelles.

### REVELATIONS D'UN ANCIEN AMBASSADEUR DE CASTRO

L'action du gouvernement de Cuba en Afrique a été confirmée, dans l'été de 1966, par les révélations d'un ancien diplomate Cubain qui avait choisi la liberté.

Le Dr. Léonel Alonso n'était pas un nouveau venu dans la politique cubaine. Etudiant, il avait été emprisonné sous Batista. Puis il



avait vécu en exil au Mexique en 1956 et 1957, en même temps que Castro, avec qui il retourna à Cuba. Après la victoire des révolutionnaires, il fut chargé de s'occuper des affaires d'Asie et d'Afrique. Il remplit des fonctions diplomatiques, puis au Ghana, où il fut en poste en 1961 et 1962 avant d'être chargé d'affaires en Indonésie, puis en Syrie et au Liban. Il accompagna Guevara dans ses pérégrinations africaines. Il représenta Cuba à la conférence afro-asiatique d'Alger en 1965 et il participa à la conférence tri-continentale de La Havane en janvier 1966.

D'après lui, Castro s'intéresse à l'Afrique et y subventionne l'agitation révolutionnaire depuis 1961. En tout cas, le Dr. Alonso fut, selon ses dires, « au centre même de la campagne de subversion entreprise en Afrique » dès son arrivée au Ghana, en 1961.

Trois officiers cubains de race noire se présentèrent à lui lorsqu'il venait d'arriver à Accra. Ils étaient munis de faux passeports et ne cachaient pas qu'ils tenaient leur mission d'une très haute instance. Ils se maintenaient en liaison directe avec La Havane en utilisant le téléscripteur de l'ambassade, mais ils usaient pour le faire d'un code secret. Reçus par N'Krumah et par l'ambassadeur soviétique, ils restèrent quatre mois au Ghana. Ils avaient en le temps d'organiser, (avec des Cubains de grade inférieur) un camp de formation de « combattants de la libération » à la frontière de la Haute-Volta. Ce centre fonctionna jusqu'à la chute de N'Krumah. Toujours d'après le Dr. Alonso, ces « combattants » étaient destinés à aller porter la révolution en Haute-Volta, au Niger, au Cameroun, au Togo, au Gabon et au Congo-Brazzaville.

La chute de N'Krumah, en février 1966 ne mit pas fin à l'intérêt que portait Castro au Ghana. Lorsque le nouveau gouvernement ghanéen ferma l'ambassade de Cuba à Accra, le 27 septembre 1966, (peut-être à la suite des révélations du Dr. Alonso) il déclara détenir la preuve que les autorités cubaines contribuaient à l'entraînement de 2.000 guérilleros ghanéens, tant à Cuba qu'au Ghana.

On verra plus loin que les Cubains, évincés du Ghana, se replièrent au Congo-Brazzaville, mais il convient de noter, toujours d'après le Dr. Alonso, quelques-uns des autres points d'application de l'action cubaine en Afrique.

En 1963, lors du conflit frontalier algéro-marocain, Castro mit quelques centaines (trois ou quatre) de soldats réguliers à la disposition du gouvernement algérien, alors dirigé par Ben Bella. Il pensait que l'opération aboutirait à la chute de la royauté et qu'elle amènerait Ben Barka au pouvoir.

En 1965, le Dr. Alonso rencontra, à la conférence d'Alger, Pablo Rivalta, qu'il avait connu en 1961 à Accra, et qui venait d'être nommé ambassadeur de Cuba en Tanzanie : la mission qu'on lui avait confiée visait le Kenya. Il fallait travailler au renversement de Kenyatta au profit d'Oginga Odinga, avec l'aide de révolutionnaires venus de Zanzibar. On a vu plus haut que des agitateurs formés à La Havane avaient joué un grand rôle dans la révolution de Zanzibar, en janvier 1964.

Castro s'intéresse de près aux actions de guerre civile qui se déroulent dans les colonies portugaises. Toujours d'après le Dr. Alonso, il aurait accueilli récemment l'aide apportée au *Parti Africain de l'Indépendance de la Guinée portugaise et des Iles du Cap-Vert* (P.A.I.G.C.V.), qu'il considère comme le mieux organisé en Afrique. En janvier 1966, le secrétaire général de ce parti, Amílcar Cabral se rendit à La Havane pour prendre part à la conférence tri-continentale. Il eut de longs entretiens avec Castro qui, depuis, lui accorde une « aide financière importante » (1).

## LES CUBAINS AU CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE

Les Cubains n'ont pas commencé à s'intéresser au Congo-Brazzaville seulement après le coup d'Etat qui renversa N'Krumah et les chassa du Ghana. Six mois plus tôt, en juillet 1965,

l'ambassadeur de Cuba à Alger, Jorge Serguera Riveri était venu s'installer à Brazzaville. Au lendemain du 19 juin 1965, Castro avait pris publiquement parti pour Ben Bella contre le colonel Boumediène qui venait de le renverser. Il s'en suivit un refroidissement dans les relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays, et le gouvernement cubain n'a plus, depuis lors, qu'un chargé d'affaires à Alger. Serguera se trouva disponible, et, transféré à Brazzaville, il y joua un rôle de premier plan dans l'implantation cubaine au Congo (2).

En janvier 1966, les deux gouvernements signèrent un accord qui permit à plusieurs centaines d'étudiants congolais (médecine et agronomie) de se rendre à Cuba, ainsi qu'à des Cubains de venir enseigner au Centre agricole national congolais, lequel dépend de Claude da Costa, ministre de l'Agriculture et de la construction. (On dit que les Cubains fondent beaucoup d'espoirs sur ce métis angolais du Congo, à qui ils réserveraient le gouvernement de... l'Angola, quand celui-ci sera « libéré »).

Ce qu'on ne savait pas alors, c'est qu'en même temps, des miliciens cubains venaient au Congo, au nombre de plusieurs centaines. Leur mission était double (au moins) : ils étaient chargés de l'instruction militaire du corps national de défense civile (une milice chargée de supplanter la police et l'armée, jugées peu sûres) et d'assurer la garde du président de la République.

On eut la révélation de cette présence et de ces deux rôles, le 27 juin 1966, et dans les jours qui suivirent.

Le 27 juin en effet, il y eut une mutinerie au sein de l'armée congolaise. Le prétexte en fut la destitution arbitraire d'un officier. En fait, les militaires en révolte protestaient contre la mise progressive de l'armée sous la coupe du parti. Le 23 juin, le gouvernement avait fait voter une loi portant transformation des forces armées congolaises en une « armée populaire nationale ». Les mutins demandaient le renoncement à cette « démocratisation » de l'armée et le départ des instructeurs militaires cubains.

La mutinerie aurait sans doute abouti au renversement du gouvernement (d'autant plus que le président de la République, Massamba-Débat se trouvait alors à Tananarive) si les Cubains n'étaient pas intervenus.

Ils sauvèrent la situation. Le premier ministre, Ambroise Noumazolay le reconnaissait sans ambages le 1<sup>er</sup> juillet : « Si nos camarades cubains n'avaient pas influencé la population, nous ne nous trouverions peut-être pas ici aujourd'hui. C'est la raison pour laquelle la présence de nos frères cubains suscite de l'opposition. Je vous garantis qu'ils ne partiront pas... Les frères cubains instructeurs continueront à instruire les populations, car un peuple désarmé est un peuple d'esclaves ».

De son côté, le gouvernement cubain, par la voix du journal du parti, *Granma*, assurait :

« Le gouvernement de La Havane, accomplissant ses devoirs internationalistes, a envoyé des armes et des instructeurs pour aider à la formation du peuple du Congo-Brazzaville. Cette aide a été envoyée par Cuba sur la demande du Congo-Brazzaville pour organiser et entraîner des milices et des éléments de l'armée de ce pays en raison des menaces impérialistes venues du Congo-Léopoldville ».

Selon le Dr. Alonso, le corps des mercenaires cubains présent au Congo serait commandé par le capitaine Terry Thorndike, l'un des trois officiers cubains qu'il reçut à Accra lorsqu'il était en poste au Ghana.

Il semble bien que les Cubains du Congo ont d'autres missions que celles qui sont proprement congolaises. Comme ils le faisaient au Ghana, ils préparent des agitateurs et des guérilleros pour les pays voisins. On a vu que, selon certaines informations, ils comptaient sur Claude da Silva pour gouverner un jour l'Angola. C'est l'enclave de Cabinda qui paraît spécialement visée.

#### LES CUBAINS EN GUINEE

La Guinée constitue elle aussi, une base cubaine en Afrique.

La présence des Cubains y a été signalée sous trois formes.

« La méfiance de Sekou Touré à l'égard de plusieurs militaires de haut grade s'est accrue et la garde présidentielle est désormais constituée de mercenaires cubains », écrivait

le 9 octobre 1966, le correspondant du *Monde* à Dakar.

On lisait le 15 décembre 1966, dans *Afrique Nouvelle*, qu'en Guinée « les Cubains de Castro ont commencé à entraîner depuis le 3 décembre (1966) des miliciens des deux sexes. Chaque section compte 7 jeunes et il y a 27 sections ».

Enfin, c'est à Masenta en Guinée que les Cubains aident à la formation d'une espèce de corps expéditionnaire de la révolution, formé de Ghanéens, dont la tâche serait de remettre N'Krumah au pouvoir. D'après le Dr. Alonso, Serguera aurait rendu visite à N'Krumah en Guinée, et il lui aurait offert, non seulement les services de la légion cubaine installée au Congo Brazzaville, mais aussi ceux d'un spécialiste cubain du sabotage, formé en U.R.S.S., un certain José Simon, qu'il avait déjà connu à Alger. Celui-ci aurait conçu l'idée de faire sauter le barrage sur la Volta afin de provoquer dans les populations ghanéennes une panique qui aurait fourni une occasion favorable à une action révolutionnaire pour remettre N'Krumah au pouvoir.

NICOLAS LANG.

(1) Le 28 février 1967, *Le Monde* reproduisant une dépêche de Reuter, selon laquelle les troupes portugaises avaient pris et détruit en Guinée un camp rebelle abritant des mercenaires étrangers que l'on croit être des Cubains. Selon le communiqué du commandement portugais, les mercenaires sont décrits comme des « Cubains au teint bronzé ».

(2) La décision d'établir des relations diplomatiques entre La Havane et Brazzaville date de mai 1964.

D'autre part, le 29 mars 1967, le ministre algérien des Affaires étrangères, Boumedienne, recevait un envoyé spécial du gouvernement cubain, M. Allard, directeur de la division Afrique-Moyen-Orient, au ministère des Affaires étrangères. Cette visite semble annoncer une normalisation des relations entre les deux pays.

**Page Denied**

Next 9 Page(s) In Document Denied

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

October 1967

### Soviet Problems in the Fiftieth Anniversary Year

The Soviet Union originally expected this year -- the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution -- to be one of gay celebrations and of further triumphs of communism throughout the world. In the event, it has not worked out that way, and the anniversary year has been marked by a series of failures which have taken the gloss off the celebrations.

The events of the year have taken place against a background of serious problems which would be difficult enough to face in any ordinary year. These include such puzzlers as whether or not to build an anti-ballistic missile defense system (at a cost approximately equal to the American estimate of \$50 billion for their own system), how far and in what direction to develop the "new economic system" (which pays more than passing obeisance to the theories and practice of capitalism), and how to control the Soviet intellectuals, whose disillusion with communism verges on outright opposition.

The Kremlin's reaction to these and other serious problems of far-reaching import has largely been one of indecision, of postponement of whatever could be postponed in order to avoid rocking the boat of anniversary celebrations. Furthermore, the tendency toward indecision has been reinforced by the necessity of reacting to the long series of events which have bespoiled the year. These include the following:

Defection of Svetlana Alliluyeva. The defection of Stalin's daughter, which has been extensively commented on in the world's press, was a severe blow to the Soviet cause.

Communist China. Mao and his Cultural Revolution have posed a growing ideological and political challenge to the USSR, making it more difficult for the USSR to hold together what is left of the unity of the world communist movement. The Chinese Communists' scorn for the USSR became acute in 1967 and went so far as a seige of the Soviet Embassy in Peking from 26 January to 13 February. The officers and crew of the Soviet freighter Svirsk were attacked by Red Guards in Dairen, China, in August.

World Conference of Communist Parties. The Kremlin tried and failed in April 1967 at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, to get the assembled communist leaders from Eastern and Western Europe to call for a world conference of communist parties. In mid-September the Kremlin launched a new campaign for an international conference, possibly to be held in connection with the celebrations in Moscow on 7 November. Since several communist parties persist in their refusal to attend, the Kremlin may have to water down its plans by settling for less than 100% representation of the world's communist parties.

(Cont.)

Space Program. The first death of a Soviet cosmonaut, Colonel Vladimir Komarov, occurred on 24 April 1967. Komarov's death while on the first mission of a "Soyuz" (Union) spacecraft was announced belatedly and ambiguously and thus caused a rash of wild rumors to circulate throughout the USSR. Komarov's death was a blow to Brezhnev and Kosygin, then attending the above-cited Karlovy Vary Conference, which was brought to a close one day earlier than planned. The Soviet space program is likely to have been set back for some time to come as a result of this misfortune.

Unity of the Communist Bloc. The political effectiveness of the Communist Bloc has been impaired by Rumania's continued insistence upon a kind of veto power. Rumania has opposed a world conference of communist parties, and has refused to break diplomatic relations with Israel and to condemn Israel as an aggressor in the Arab-Israeli war. Rumania's establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany angered the East Germans and raised fears that other East European countries would follow suit and thus weaken the Soviets' position that the Bloc should stay united to ward off the threat of the German "revanchists."

Support to North Vietnam. Soviet aid to North Vietnam, estimated at \$1 billion in 1967, will be continued in 1968 according to an agreement signed on 23 September. The Soviet surface-to-air missiles (SAM's) supplied to North Vietnam have proven exceptionally expensive and have scored a very low number of hits relative to the number launched. In spite of its extensive support, the Soviet Union is unable to show that the North Vietnamese cause has been advanced during the year.

Disenchantment of Soviet Writers. The regime has failed to come to terms with liberal writers and to enlist their support for the state's objectives. On 22 January a group of young writers was arrested for demonstrating for the repeal of Article 70 of the RSFSR legal code (and thus demonstrating for the release of Sinyavsky and Daniel, who were imprisoned for allegedly violating this article's prohibition of anti-Soviet propaganda). One of the demonstrators, Viktor Khaustov, was tried and sentenced on 17 February and the other three, V. Bukovski, V. Delone, and Ye. Kushchev, were tried and sentenced on 1 September.

Earlier, the Fourth Writers' Congress convened in May, was reported as an insipid affair. It was later learned, however, that the brilliant Soviet author Aleksandr Solzhenitsin, who served over eight years in a concentration camp, had sent a letter to 400 of the 600 persons attending the Congress in which he raised the burning issues of censorship and intellectual freedom. His demand that these issues be discussed at the Congress was supported by 80 other Soviet writers; however the leaders of the Writers' Union were able to avoid any such discussion. Solzhenitsin's letter played an unexpected and important role when it was read at the end of June at the Czech Writers' Congress, where writer-regime dissidence flared sharply.

Exposures of Soviet Spy Networks. On 22 March 1967 the Italian government announced the arrest of Soviet spy Giorgio Rinaldi, his wife, and accomplice. Subsequent investigations led to the exposure of the biggest Soviet espionage network uncovered since the war, with ramifications in over twenty countries in Western Europe, Africa and the Near East. Insult was added to injury when, in September of this year, another Soviet spy was arrested, this time in South Africa. The undercover agent, Yuriy Nikolaevich Loginov, told South African officials of dozens of other Soviet espionage agents operating in clandestine networks in Europe, Africa and Latin America. This case could hardly have been more poorly timed for the Soviets since the investigation of clues provided by Loginov will undoubtedly extend for months and will, in all likelihood, result in the arrests of additional Soviet spies at the very time the Kremlin is celebrating the anniversary and proclaiming the triumph of "peaceful coexistence."

IASO Conference. The first meeting of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (IASO) was held in Havana early in August this year. The principal result of the conference was to sanctify the Castro thesis that only "armed struggle" (that is, guerrilla warfare) will liberate the American hemisphere. This thesis is contradictory to the Soviet belief that both armed struggle and mass (non-violent) struggle have their place according to circumstances, and it resulted in a heightened division between Moscow-supported Communist parties on the continent and Cuban-backed guerrillas. This poses an acute dilemma for the Soviets, who support Castro with \$1 million per day and treasure Cuba as the only outpost of communism in the hemisphere and thus have no alternative but to continue to back Castro.

\* \* \* \* \*

Faced with this series of adversities, the Soviet leaders have wildly lashed out against the supposed causes of their misfortune. An excellent example was an article in Komsomolskaya Pravda on 22 July 1967 which alleged that Soviet difficulties are the result of a multi-billion dollar U.S. program of "anti-Soviet ideological aggression" designed to spoil the anniversary celebrations. In addition, the article viciously raked Svetlana Alliluyeva, describing her as "a sick woman with a sexually disturbed face." Other Soviet attacks, against Svetlana and against all other detractors of the Soviet system, are to be expected during the remainder of the year.

The Soviet government is expected to attempt some spectacular feat in space, which will help offset the adverse publicity which has greeted them this year. The government has declared two areas in the Pacific Ocean closed to navigation until the end of October and the western press has reported that Soviet monitor ships normally associated with space shots are being deployed in the Pacific. The exact nature of the venture is unknown, but it is expected that, for propaganda purposes, it will be as spectacular as possible.

A rumor has been circulating in the Soviet Union that the Soviet government will declare an amnesty for political and criminal prisoners in connection with the festivities on 7 November., following a previous amnesty granted after Stalin's death. Although this move would be joyfully welcomed throughout the world, it would be a difficult decision for the Soviet government to make because of its implicit admission that tens of thousands of persons are still imprisoned in that country for "political crimes."

October 1967

Soviet Amnesty Rumored

by Henry Shapiro, UPI, Moscow, Sept. 10, 1967

The Supreme Soviet (Parliament) of the Soviet Union will meet Oct. 10 for the first time this year, it was announced Sunday.

Informed sources said the Parliament is expected to approve an amnesty for minor non-political prisoners to mark the celebrations in November of the 1917 Revolution which overthrew the czarist regime and brought the communists into power.

The Supreme Soviet is the country's highest legislative body. Although in principle it has as much, if not more authority, than any Western Parliament, it has in practice become largely a confirmatory body.

The real work of framing laws and administering the Soviet Union, apart from the Communist Party, is performed by the presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The 37-member presidium is almost always in session and its decrees are ratified without debate by the full membership of the two houses of Parliament.

The agenda will not be made public until the Parliament meets next month. But informed sources said the members will concern themselves mainly with measures on the 50th Anniversary celebrations of the Bolshevik Revolution Nov. 7.

Among the proposed jubilee laws is the amnesty -- such as is centrally enacted on historic occasions -- for the release of persons serving prison sentences for relatively minor crimes.

Such amnesties usually do not apply to political offenders like writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, who were convicted two years ago for publishing anti-Soviet satires abroad.

It also has been reported that the Parliament will finally get around to adopting formally the current five-year economic plan which was launched two years ago.

The plan in broad outlines was adopted last year by the 23rd Communist Party Congress, but details have not been worked out, presumably because the Kremlin was awaiting an assessment of the recent economic reforms and their effect on production.

Among other unfinished business before the session will be:

--Ratification of the American-Soviet Consular Convention, which the Russians, who normally approve such accords automatically, have delayed because of the Vietnam War.



-- A report by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on Soviet foreign policy, particularly issues connected with the Middle East situation.

Sessions of the Supreme Soviet are usually preceded by a plenary meeting of the ruling central committee of the Communist Party which plays down the guidelines to be followed by Parliament.

One such plenum will probably be convoked Oct. 9.

WASHINGTON POST  
12 April 1967

# West Smashes Big Red Spy Ring

By ORR KELLY  
Star Staff Writer

Italian military intelligence agents have in the last 3½ weeks scored a historic "black war" victory over their Soviet counterparts.

Although the full scope of the operation is only beginning to emerge, it now appears that the Italian intelligence agency, SID, has crushed a major espionage operation of the Soviet agency, GRU, built up carefully over the last seven years and aimed at the military heart of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

So far, at least 30 persons have been arrested and five Soviet officials have been expelled from European nations. There is every indication that further arrests and expulsions will follow.

How successful the Soviet spy effort had been is not clearly known and this aspect of the case may never be fully revealed. But there is convincing evidence that it had either failed in—or had not yet achieved—its major objective of penetrating the U.S. bases in the Mediterranean area and installations of NATO on a wholesale basis.

The Soviet spy network began to come apart on the pleasantly warm afternoon of March 15 when Italian counter-espionage agents grabbed a courier at Monginevro Pass on the French-Italian border and seized 19 rolls of microfilm.

Within hours, Soviet diplomats and businessmen who were almost certainly commissioned officers in the GRU began packing their bags and heading for home.

Five of them were ordered to leave Italy, Cyprus and Greece. Others as far away as Austria, Morocco and Japan simply packed up and disappeared.

Ten persons were arrested almost immediately in Italy, Cyprus, Austria and Greece. On Friday, it was revealed another 20 persons had been picked up by counter-intelligence officers in Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Morocco and Tunisia.

Gradually, in bits and pieces, the story of the spy operation and the counter-intelligence work that broke it up has emerged. It is now possible, by patching together these bits and pieces, and by discarding some of the erroneous early rumors, to tell the story in considerable detail.

The four key figures in the case are Giorgio Rinaldi, 39, his wife, Angela Maria Antoniola Rinaldi, 52, their chauffeur, Armando Lorenzo Girard, 40, and Rinaldi's case officer, Yuri Kuzmich Pavlenko, 35, a GRU officer who was an attache at the Soviet Embassy in Rome.

Until their arrest, Rinaldi and his wife operated an antique store known as the Bottega di Lagno ("The Wood Shop") on the Borgo Medievale del Valentino in a restored medieval section of Turin. Rinaldi was an avid parachutist and frequently traveled throughout Europe to attend sky-diving meets.

His pudgy wife, whose true role in the spy operation is not yet known publicly, was an artist of some ability.

Rinaldi, who became a guerrilla fighter at the age of 16 during World War II, made his first contact with the Russians in 1956. By 1960 he had been recruited as an operative.

Just when the SID began to keep a careful eye on him is not clear, but Italian intelligence is known to have had a special interest in him for at least five years—two years before the GRU began to build up the elaborate espionage apparatus for which he served as the center point or principal agent.

Rinaldi was one of a number of persons the SID—Servizio Informazione Difesa—had been watching because of known contacts with Soviet agents. SID's interest in Rinaldi quickened last July when he and his wife flew from Paris to Moscow under assumed names.

SID agents also were monitoring a mysterious transmission from a high-powered radio station near Moscow. Although they could not decode the messages because the key to the code was changed too often, they noticed that the transmis-

sions seemed to coincide with trips by Rinaldi to the Swiss town of Monteux and to Rome and with Girard's trips to Spain.

In recruiting spies, intelligence organizations will use any device they think will work: Love, sex, fear, pride, ambition. In Rinaldi's case, it was that old standby—money. According to an account in one Italian newspaper, he received 400,000 lire a month, the equivalent of about \$650. It was not a great deal of money, but it must have seemed handsome to Rinaldi, who had never made much of a success of anything he had undertaken.

There also were appeals to his pride and to his sense of belonging, as he was drawn even deeper into the Soviet espionage apparatus. He received special training in codes, photography and radio operation in both Italy and Switzerland. On at least four occasions, the most recent last July, he was flown to GRU headquarters in Russia for further training and pep talks by high ranking Soviet intelligence officials.

The early development of the spy apparatus centered around Rinaldi apparently was under the direction of Col. Mikhail Ilich Badin, a GRU officer who, suddenly left Vienna shortly after Rinaldi was arrested.

Since late in 1964, when Pavlenko was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Rome, he appears to have been Rinaldi's chief contact within the GRU. It is possible, of course, that Badin was still exercising control over the whole operation from his post in Vienna.

The full scope of the spy operation is probably not yet known even to the best informed Italian military intelligence officers who broke it up. But it appears to have been concerned primarily with U.S. and NATO bases in Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus, with support mechanisms in Switzerland, Austria and France.

There also are indications it extended from Morocco on the Atlantic coast to Somalia on the shores of the Red Sea and perhaps as far away as Japan.

Some of the Soviet agents involved may have been operating under the cover of positions with the International Labor Organization and the International Telecommunications Union, both in Geneva, and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

## Spanish Targets

The targets in Spain reportedly were the U.S. installations at Sanjuro near Zaragossa, El Ferrol near Cartagena, Torrejon de Ardoz near Madrid, and Rota, near Cadiz.

Of these, only two are of major interest.

The Torrejon base is headquarters of the 16th Air Force and is the home base for three squadrons of F100 fighters of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing. The base at Zaragossa is in a caretaker status.

The U.S. base at Rota is the Navy's largest installation in Europe. It serves as a major supply center for the 6th Fleet and can handle the biggest and fastest warplanes and ships in the fleet.

## Start of Pipeline

It is also the beginning of a 485-mile pipeline that feeds fuel to Air Force bases in the interior of Spain. El Ferrol is a fuel annex.

The Defense Department, under a standing policy, never confirms nor denies the presence of atomic weapons at any of its bases. But it is reasonable to assume that the ships and planes based at Rota and the planes based at Torrejon can deliver nuclear weapons.

The network also encompassed the British Royal Air Force bomber base at Akrotiri in southern Cyprus as well as communications facilities in Cyprus, the U.S. Air Force base at Aviano in northern Italy and bases in Greece.

It is not yet clear how many were involved—willingly or unwittingly—in the spy operation. But it must be assumed that there were at least several persons at each of the bases,

plus their contacts who served as links in the chain back to Rinaldi.

#### Called Key Link

A key link was the Rinaldi's chauffeur, Girard, who hampered about southern Europe in his Volkswagen retrieving information from "dead drops," where it had been left for pick-up, and delivering it to Rinaldi.

On March 10, Girard left in his Volkswagen for a trip to Spain and SID agents tried to follow him. But he never traveled more than 40 miles an hour, so it was impossible to trail him without making him suspicious.

From March 12 on, Italian agent put a special watch on the Alpine passes into Italy from the north. Late on the afternoon of March 15, he drove into the trap at the Monginevro pass.

Italian police whisked him out of his car and turned him over to the SID counterintelligence officers, who quickly found what they were looking for. They flashed the word to Turin and the other jaw of the trap slammed shut on Rinaldi and his wife.

Rinaldi began to talk, supplying information that will keep Western intelligence officers busy for months, perhaps even years, untangling the leads he furnished. Whether he is still supplying valuable information is not clear. He reportedly suffered a nervous breakdown and had to be hospitalized.

According to one unconfirmed report, he was so terrified that his former masters would attempt to poison him that he would eat only eggs that had been boiled in his presence.

#### Copious Notes Found

But probably of equal or even greater importance was what the SID agents found at the Rinaldis' Bottega di Lagno.

As they had expected, they discovered the kind of supplies that would normally be furnished to an agent in Rinaldi's position: radio equipment, code books, concealment gadgets, chemicals for secret writing and micro-dot equipment.

And then, to their delight, they also discovered that Rinaldi had violated one of the most basic rules of the spy business. He had made copious notes about things he should have committed to memory. He and his wife seemed to have thrown nothing away. The officers found a vast assortment of instructions, letters, reports and notebooks.

Immediately after the arrest of the Rinaldis, there was a report that they had enlisted 300 NATO officers in their spy apparatus. This was subsequently denied by NATO officials and it now appears that what was involved was a target list of persons the Russians would like to have enlisted rather than a list of those who actually had been drawn into the spy network.

#### Arrests Kept Secret

Girard and the Rinaldis were picked up late Wednesday, March 15. But the arrests were kept secret while the SID agents waited for even bigger fish to swim into their trap.

By that time, the officers knew that the Rinaldis had used a number of points in both Turin and Rome for passing on information. There were "dead drops" at the cathedral and the zoo in Turin and in the streets and parks of Rome.

After Rinaldi was picked up, but before his arrest was made public, there was one last detailed radio transmission from Moscow that agents listened to on Rinaldi's Grundig-Satellite radio.

Rinaldi supplied the key to the code and Italian agents had instructions for him to leave the films brought back by Girard in a hole beside the fifth tree in a row of trees on a country road outside Rome.

#### Spot Staked Out

They staked out the spot on the afternoon of March 19. About 10:45 p.m. the following night a man and a woman in a Fiat—Pavlenko and his wife—stopped.

Pavlenko got out and retrieved the material from beneath the tree. When he saw the officers, he tried to get away but two cars quickly cut him off.

The Italian government informed the Soviet Embassy that he was considered persona non grata and that he had 48 hours to get out of the country. He didn't even wait that long. The following day, Pavlenko, his wife Natalya, and their 6-year-old son, Anatoly, boarded a plane for home.

#### Greece Expels Two

By the end of the week, Greece had expelled two Soviet officials, Albert Zacharov, second secretary at the embassy, and Igor Ochurkov, a member of the Soviet Trade Mission.

Two others, Boris Petrin, cultural attache at the embassy

in Cyprus, and Nikolay Ranov, representative of the Soviet airline Aeroflot since 1961, were ordered to leave Cyprus.

A series of arrests, which has almost certainly not ended, then began.

In the wake of the disclosures of the arrest of the Rinaldis, a Soviet diplomat abruptly left his post in Japan and another departed from Morocco with equal haste. It is not yet clear, at least to those on the outside, what roles, if any, they may have played in the spy network.

The arrest of the Rinaldis also may help to explain several other incidents in various parts of Europe in recent months.

In the latter part of January, the Brussels newspaper *Le Soir* reported that two men in a car, bearing license plates issued to the Soviet Embassy were picked up by officers of the Belgian Ministry of Justice as they stopped at a restaurant at Hever, a small town in Brabant province.

One of the men, *Le Soir* reported, was an agent of Aeroflot, the Soviet airline which employed one of the men expelled from Cyprus. Although the background of these two men is not known, some Aeroflot officials have received special training as espionage agents at the Military and Diplomatic University in Moscow.

Late in February, the Swiss asked the Russians to recall Ivan Yakovlovich Petrov, senior representative to the International Telecommunications Union in Geneva, after he allegedly asked a senior Swiss civil servant to become a spy for Russia. Here again, it is not known whether this incident might have been connected with the Rinaldi case.

Even earlier, on Nov. 4, 1966, the Italians expelled Kir Lemzenko, a Soviet trade attache, who was thought to be spying on the Naples NATO base and reporting on U.S. fleet movements in the Mediterranean.

His expulsion followed the defection of Mrs. Olga Farmakovskaya, a green-eyed, red-haired beauty whose husband, Soviet Navy Commander Vadim Vadimovich Farmakovsky, was believed to be a high-ranking GRU official. She slipped off a cruise ship in Beirut, Lebanon, and was whisked away to Brussels.

Perhaps the way in which these other bits and pieces fit into the Rinaldi picture—if, indeed they fit at all—may be revealed as the leads provided by the arrest of the Italian parachutist are run down.

The broad outlines of how Rinaldi operated are now fairly well known. But some gaps remain in this picture, too.

It seems certain that he used his powerful radio apparatus to receive instructions, but it is not clear whether he also used it to transmit information or whether he passed his information to Soviet contacts in Italy for transmission to Russia. If the mode of operation of the Swedish spy, Col. Sig Wennerstrom, is any indication, he probably used both methods.

Portions of the Italian press, which has tended to give rather flamboyant treatment to the story, have speculated that Mrs. Rinaldi, who had served in the Italian armed forces under Mussolini, was actually the brains of the operation. According to other accounts, she merely helped her husband by decoding instructions from Moscow.

As a result of the arrest of the Rinaldis, the entire Mediterranean area is in the throes of a severe case of spy fever, and there are persistent reports that, even though this already appears to be the most extensive Soviet spy ring ever exposed, only the tip of the iceberg has so far been seen.

NEW YORK TIMES

23 March 1967

## Soviet Aide Defends Rule of Disputed Bessarabia

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, March 22—The briefness of the visit here last weekend of Rumania's top leaders and the terseness of the announcement that followed it have led to widespread speculation that it may have ended abruptly with negative results.

Nicolae Ceausescu, First Secretary of the Rumanian Communist party, and Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer arrived Friday and left Saturday.

The brief report about the visit in Sunday's issue of Pravda, the newspaper of the Soviet Communist party, contained none of the standard phrases about complete identity of views that customarily conclude meetings of leaders of the Communist nations.

A presumption among observers here is that Rumania stood by the positions that have made her the odd man out in the Soviet bloc and notably did not commit herself to participate in the conference of European Communist parties to be held in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, next month.

In addition to world issues on which the Soviet Union and Rumania do not see eye to eye, a vexing problem that has encumbered relations between them without ever becoming an open dispute has recently come to the surface.

### Longstanding Dispute

The problem concerns Bessarabia, a region between the Dniester and Prut Rivers, disputed between Russia and Rumania for more than a century and annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940.

Bessarabia, a Rumanian territory from 1918 to 1940, now forms part of the Moldavian Soviet Republic. Newspapers reaching here from Kishinev, capital of Bessarabia and since 1940 of the Moldavian Republic, give evidence that anti-Soviet Bessarabian nationalism is on the upsurge and that the Communist party has embarked on a determined campaign against it.

Sovietskaya Moldavia, newspaper of the republic government and party organizations, reported in its issue of Feb. 16 on a plenary session of the party's central committee dominated by a long speech by Ivan Bodyul, the first secretary.

A major part of the speech was devoted to attacks on "misleading propaganda" that assailed the Russian claim to Bessarabia. The propagandists were only vaguely identified by Mr. Bodyul and other speakers as being in the West, or the "imperialist camp."

Mr. Bodyul's speech indicated plainly that the propaganda had made some inroads among the population. After a recital of evidence of historical links between Russians and Moldavians, Mr. Bodyul declared:

"Such are the historical facts. Unfortunately, they are not well known to public opinion. As a result, some people easily fall under the influence of misleading propaganda and quite often become themselves the spreaders of it, sometimes without being condemned for it."

### Counter-Propaganda Asked

Mr. Bodyul called for the organization of "counter-propaganda" that would employ the most qualified specialists in the party, government, science and culture for a campaign "in newspapers and magazines, on radio and television, in books, pamphlets and other publications."

"At a time of mounting slander about the past and present of the Moldavian people, the scientists should fully unmask the old and new 'specialists' of Moldavia," the party chief said.

At the same time, the central committee relieved of his function the man who would head such a campaign, the official in charge of agitation and propaganda, V. K. Barbulat. He was replaced by Antoni Konstantinov, who had been first secretary for the city of Kishinev.

Rumanians are far from reconciled to the loss of Bessarabia, and in the last three years veiled references have been made in speeches and publications that run counter to the "Bessarabia was always Russian" claim expressed in Kishinev.

In 1964, Rumania published four obscure manuscripts by Karl Marx that cast doubt on Russia's assertion of sovereignty. In a major policy speech last May, Mr. Ceausescu also appeared to raise the question.

PRETORIA NEWS, Johannesburg, South Africa  
September 9, 1967

# TRAINED RED SPY CONFESSES TO SPECIAL S.A. MISSION

## *Security Chief On K.G.B. Activities*

**YURI NIKOLAEVITCH LOGINOV (34)**, arrested by Security Police in Johannesburg recently, has confessed that he was a Russian spy on a special mission in South Africa, General H. J. van den Bergh, Chief of the South African Security Police, said in Pretoria today.

At a special Press conference in the Wachthuis, National Headquarters of the South African Police, General Van den Bergh described Loginov as a highly intelligent and carefully trained professional spy.

Loginov, the first Soviet spy to be arrested in South Africa, has been in South Africa since January 1967. He was briefed on life in the West by the celebrated Soviet spy, Rudolf Abel, who was arrested in America for espionage in 1957, and was smuggled into the West in the cabin of the captain of the Soviet vessel, Kamensk.

Gen. Van den Bergh said Loginov was arrested in a block of flats near the Johannesburg General Hospital and that the police had been aware of his presence in South Africa for some time.

Loginov did not resist arrest but was shocked when the police appeared at his flat. He did not speak Afrikaans although he spoke English and foreign languages.

This is the text of General Van den Bergh's statement:

"A Russian spy, using a false

name, has been arrested. He has revealed particulars of contacts, missions and travels which involve 23 countries on five continents. It is now possible to disclose that an individual, posing as a Canadian citizen named Edmund Trinka has been arrested by the security police in Johannesburg after a painstaking investigation.

### **SPECIALLY TRAINED**

"At the time of his arrest, documents and equipment peculiar to a professional spy, were found in his possession. Subsequent investigations have confirmed suspicions that he made use of a false passport to enter the Republic of South Africa and that he was involved in subversive activities as well as the illegal international transporting of currency.

"After his arrest, he confessed to the security police that he was not a Canadian citizen but that his true name was Yuri Nikolaevitch Loginov and that he was in fact born in Moscow in 1933. He also confessed that he was a fully-trained long-term Russian spy attached to the K.G.B. — the notorious Soviet Intelligence Service and Secret

Police — on a special mission.

"According to Loginov, he is a married man living in enforced separation from his wife

Nira. She was also recruited by the K.G.B. and was sent to Cuba for training and to perform certain intelligence missions against Cuba. She was not entirely successful in her mission, however, and as a consequence caused a political scandal in Cuba which was covered up only through the use of considerable Russian diplomatic pressure. As a result, she was deemed by the K.G.B. as unsuitable to accompany her husband abroad on his intelligence missions.

### **FASCINATING STORY**

"Loginov, who has been in South Africa since January, has revealed a fascinating story of years of training and preparation given to him by the K.G.B. for his illegal missions abroad.

His departure from Moscow was preceded by years of training in the Czech and English languages, among other things, and by practice trips through the Soviet Bloc and to various Western countries under false identities. He was also given

courses on how to live abroad, on how to manage secret operations, and how to utilize secret writing, codes and ciphers in these operations.

Loginov received part of his training at the Foreign Relations Institute in Russia, where he was friendly with Anatoly Gromyko, son of the present Soviet Foreign Minister. Another of his friends was Zoya Zarubina, who is dean at the Soviet Institute of foreign languages. This institute has often been used for the training of spies.

"Zarubina's father is a well-known former spy in the United States where he was involved in the notorious Sobel case during the years 1939 to 1961. On K.G.B. instructions Zoya Zarubina assigned various intelligence missions to Loginov during the course of their association.

#### CANADIAN PASSPORT

"Loginov's training missions, travels, contact instructions and secret mailing addresses involve Italy, Finland, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, Switzerland, Kenya, Indonesia, Iran, Australia, France, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Argentina and Brazil.

"One of the K.G.B. officers involved in the handling of his case, Colonel Yevgeny Ivanovich Mosevkin, placed him aboard the Soviet vessel Kamensk and he was smuggled to the West through the Kiel canal during January, 1967. Loginov hid in the cabin of the

ship's captain and both the captain and the mate were aware of the fact that he was a K.G.B. agent proceeding on a mission.

"Loginov's Canadian passport was obtained with the aid of the two K.G.B. officers, Yevgeny Mikhailovich, a Soviet Consul in Canada, and "Nick," a K.G.B. officer in Nairobi, who made use of the K.G.B.-forged South African passport to obtain the Canadian document."

"Other K.G.B. officers with whom Loginov came in contact from time to time include Konstantin Ivanovich Frolov, who had served in Buenos Aires and Australia, and one Yuriy Ivanovich Lyudin. Loginov alleges that Lyudin is in fact identical with Yuriy Ivanovich Modin, who until quite recently was serving as Soviet Counsellor in India.

"Another of Loginov's K.G.B. handlers was Vitaly Grigorievich Pavlov, who, using the false identity of Nikolai Kedrov, is now serving as Soviet Counsellor and K.G.B. Chief in a Soviet Embassy in Western Europe."

#### EXPOSED

"Pavlov was exposed as a spy in the famous Canadian spy case involving Igor Gouzenko in the 1940s. Other persons so far mentioned by Loginov include Aleksandr Selinkh, Morflot (Soviet Shipping Line) representative in a West European country, Anatoly Kosolapov, director of the Baltic Shipping Line in the same country, Aleksy V. Tiblayshin, a Russian ostensibly working for Unesco in Paris back in the 1930s, who was assigned to Cairo while Loginov was there, Yuriy Chekulayev, who is at present assigned to the Soviet Embassy in a country in the Near East as Third Secretary, and Boris Antsimovich Skoridov, who has been assigned to the Soviet Embassy in London under

the false name of Boris Zhiltsov.

Loginov previously met Selikh, the Morflot representative, in a West European country while en route to Egypt, where he had an espionage mission directed against the Egyptian Government. Loginov was met by Viktor Vizgunov, another K.G.B. officer.

General Van den Bergh said that as Loginov proceeded with his confessions the names of still more K.G.B. officers and details of their "nefarious activities" throughout the world were being revealed.

General Van den Bergh appealed to the public who had been in touch with Loginov since he had come to South Africa to report to the Security Police.

#### EXPRESS REPORTER

**COLONEL RUDOLF IVANOVICH ABEL**, the man who briefed the now unmasked Russian agent in South Africa, Yuri Nikolaevich Loginov, on life in the West, was one of the most daring spies ever to be caught in the United States.

A "master spy", Colonel Abel operated for years in the United States without being detected and transmitted information to Russia by various adroit and devious methods.

He was arrested in 1957 while masquerading as a Brooklyn artist and sent to jail for 30 years. He could have been sentenced to death.

As 55-year-old head of the American "KGB spy ring," the Colonel was arrested purely by chance as an illegal immigrant. It was while Federal Bureau of Investigation agents were holding him for deportation that they uncovered his secret headquarters at his studio.

In the studio — directly opposite the Brooklyn courthouse where he was eventually convicted — detectives found microfilms of military secrets, a short-wave radio and a hoard of spy gadgets which included hollowed-out coins, pens, pencils, bolts and handcuffs.

His special objective at all times, it was later revealed, was to obtain and transmit atomic energy secrets. His studio contained photographs, plans, models,

notes and instruments — all relating to top secret installations.

Loginov, who posed as a Canadian citizen and used the name of Edmund Trinka, was friendly with the son of another notorious spy in the United States at the time of Abel's conviction.

The friend was Zoya Zarubina, whose father was involved in the Sobel spy case in 1957. Jack Sobel, 53, his wife, Myra, 52, and a friend, Jacob Alban, 64, were all sent to jail for terms of imprisonment ranging from four to seven years.

#### VARIOUS MISSIONS

Now it has been disclosed that Zoya Zarubina, dean at the Soviet Institute of Foreign Languages, assigned various intelligence missions to Loginov on the instructions of the KGB. The Institute of Foreign Languages has often been used for the training of spies.

It was revealed at the Sobel trial that the Russian-born film producer, Boris Morros, who used to make Laurel and Hardy films and visited South Africa in 1958, was an American counter-spy within the Sobel spy ring. He was one of the chief witnesses against them.

SUNDAY EXPRESS, Johannesburg, South Africa  
September 10, 1967

# THE MEN WHO BRIEFED RED SPY ADMITS SUBVERSIVE ROLE IN SOUTH AFRICA

## SOVIET SPY

EXPRESS REPORTER

THE DRAMATIC story of the captured Soviet spy was disclosed in Pretoria yesterday by Major-General H. J. van den Bergh, head of the Security Police. "A Russian spy, using a false name, has been arrested," he told a special Press conference.

"He has revealed particulars of contacts, missions and travels which involve 23 countries on five continents."

He posed as a Canadian citizen with the name Edmund Trinka, but after his arrest by the Security Police in Johannesburg he confessed that he was not a Canadian and that his true name was Yuri Nikolaevitch Loginov, born in Moscow in 1933.

He entered South Africa in January with a false passport. On arrest, documents and equipment "peculiar to a professional spy" were found in his possession. Investigations confirmed that he was involved in subversive activities and illegal international transporting of currency.

### NOTORIOUS SERVICE

"He confessed that he was a fully-trained long-term Russian spy attached to the K.G.B. — the notorious Soviet intelligence service and secret police — on a special mission," said General Van den Bergh.

Loginov's wife, Nira, does not accompany her husband on his missions. Also recruited by the K.G.B., she was not entirely successful on an intelligence mission against Cuba.

Before leaving Moscow, Loginov studied the Czech and English languages and made practice trips through the Soviet bloc and to various Western countries under false identities.

### CODES

He was also given courses on how to live abroad, how to manage secret operations and how to use secret writing, codes and ciphers in these operations.

He was briefed by Rudolf Abel, a well-known Soviet spy. At the Foreign Relations Institute in Russia he was friendly with Anatoly Gromyko, son of the Soviet Foreign Minister.

Another friend was Zoya Zarubina, Dean at the Soviet Institute of Foreign Languages — often used for the training of spies. Zarubina's father was involved in the Sobel case from 1959 to 1961.

### MISSION

On K.G.B. instructions, Zoya Zarubina assigned various intelligence missions to Loginov during the course of their association.

Loginov's training missions, travels, contact instructions and secret mailing addresses involved Italy, Finland, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, Switzerland, Kenya, Indonesia, Iran, Australia, France, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, the Argentine and Brazil.

A K.G.B. officer Colonel Yevgeny Ivanovich Mosevlin, placed him aboard the Soviet vessel Kamensk and he was smuggled to the West through the Kiel Canal in January, 1967.

### HIDDEN

He hid in the captain's cabin,

who with the mate, knew he was a K.G.B. agent on a mission. His Canadian passport was obtained with the aid of K.G.B. officers Yevgeny Mikhailovich, a Soviet Consul in Canada, and "Nick" in Nairobi, who used a K.G.B.-forged South African passport to obtain the Canadian document.

Loginov came in contact with K.G.B. officers Konstantin Ivanovich Frolov, who served in Buenos Aires and Australia; Yuriy Ivanovich Lyudin, who is alleged by Loginov to be Yuri Ivanovich Modin, who until recently served as Soviet counsellor in India.

### EXPOSED

"Another of Loginov's K.G.B. handlers was Vitaly Grigoriyich Pavlov, who, using the false identity of Nikolai Kedrov, is serving as Soviet counsellor and K.G.B. chief in a Soviet embassy in Western Europe," said General Van den Bergh.

"Pavlov was exposed as a spy in the famous Canadian spy case involving Igor Gouzenko in the 1940's."

Loginov has mentioned Aleksandr Selikh, of Morflot (the Soviet shipping line); a representative in a West European country; Anatoliy Kosolapov, director of the Baltic Shipping Line in the same country; Aleksey V. Tiblayshin, a Russian ostensibly working for Unesco in Paris in the 1950's, who was assigned to Cairo while Loginov was there; Yuriy Chekulayev, assigned to the Soviet Embassy in a Near East country as third-secretary; and Boris Anisimovich Skoridov, assigned to the Soviet Embassy in London under the false name of Boris Zhiltsov.

Loginov previously met Selikh en route to Egypt on an earlier espionage mission aboard the Russian ship Ryazan.

General Van den Bergh said that as Loginov proceeded with his confessions the names of more K.G.B. officers and details of their "nefarious activities" throughout the world were being revealed.

50X1-HUM

**Page Denied**

Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied



October 1967

Excerpts From Recent Issues  
Of U.S. News and World Report

26 June 1967

In the Mideast, too, cooler heads seem to be thinking about prosperity.

Splits appear to be widening between "have" and "have not" Arabs. The "haves" own vast oil fields and are gradually resuming production. The "have nots" lack oil, but are screaming for a ban on sale to Britain and the U.S.

Russians are fanning schemes for seizure of Western-company operations.

"The hopeful sign as of now is that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are back on," said one oilman, when the two biggest Arab oil producers resumed shipments. They normally pump out close to 5 million barrels a day.

Another sign of an Arab split over oil comes from Egypt, of all places.

Western oilmen note that Cairo's boss, Nasser, hadn't gone so far by mid-June as to kick out U.S. oil companies drilling and producing there -- despite his demands that Arab countries quit shipping to the U.S. and Britain.

Cynical Russians are undercutting their Arab allies, too. Soviets are offering Red oil to West Europe, including Britain, a No. 1 devil to the Arabs.

Other Arab weapons are proving impotent, too.

Nasser threatened that Arabs would pull investments out of London. Only one country -- the Sudan -- moved 30 million dollars from London to Zurich.

But the Swiss moved it right back to London to get higher interest rates.

That's why diplomats are putting little stock in bluffs of economic war.

You see more reasons in this summary of Arab dependence on the West:

EGYPT -- Nearly broke but has had visions of becoming a net oil exporter sometime this year. Oil could even pull the country out of the red and attract industry. But now will U.S. and European countries invest there?

(Cont.)

SYRIA -- Depends on payments from oil pipelines owned by British and American firms. Now the pipelines are shut off and so are the payments. Usually exports grains, cotton and wool, but bad weather and war are crimping output.

JORDAN -- No oil. No other valuable resources. No manufacturing of note.

Main income: 34 million dollars a year from tourists headed chiefly for shrines now in Israeli hands, 35 to 40 million a year in cash handouts from U.S.

IRAQ -- On the edge of bankruptcy. Owes the International Monetary Fund 40 millions. Lost money this year when Syria blocked pipelines from northern fields to the Mediterranean. Depends on oil to pay for food, manufactures.

ALGERIA -- An oil country that's spending more than it's earning.

Imports of arms, food, machinery, steel, cars and trucks, other goods are outrunning earnings. Three fourths of exports -- oil, wine, citrus fruits, iron ore -- go to France. Sales of natural gas to Britain have been cut off.

SAUDI ARABIA -- Well heeled. Has salted away earnings.

Oil money pays for nearly everything -- food, manufactures, equipment.

KUWAIT -- All its imports also depend on oil income. So does a social and educational program. But Kuwait has over 1 billion dollars of gold and foreign currency reserves. Big amounts are deposited in London.

LIBYA -- New oil boom led and financed largely by American companies. This has drained workers from agriculture, made Libya almost totally dependent on oil. Regime has put away more than 600 million dollars in reserves.

LEBANON -- Least dependent on oil of all Arab countries. Makes its money from banking, commercial services and travelers. Reserves of 280 million dollars are needed to pay for grains, manufactured products when business falls.

Added up, Arab economies don't amount to much when you take away oil. Even Nasser's 4 million dollars a week from the Suez Canal is chicken feed alongside the needs of Egypt and other Arabs. Closure of the Canal is proving more of a drain on Egypt's treasury than a bottleneck to world shipping.

No wonder the prospects of a prolonged oil embargo are doubtful.

Some Arabs, at least, are discovering the values of Western prosperity.

Mideastern war forces some countries to look beyond money for a change.

More lands are beginning to think about the safety of their raw materials.

Oilless South Africa is one. It's stepping up plans to sink 280 million dollars in a new plant to make oil and gasoline from coal.

Japanese leaders aim to cut their dependence on Mideastern oil from 90 per cent now to 50 per cent in 20 years. Japan is negotiating concessions that will let drillers hunt for oil in Indonesia. Alaska, Canada look tempting.

Britain is studying long-term agreements with stable, non-Arab oil lands.

New patterns are being shaped in world shipping, too.

Suez Canal will be bypassed more frequently even after it reopens.

Our Tokyo bureau cables this size-up from world shipping experts there:

"Egypt's Nasser can close the Canal indefinitely without seriously crimping world shipping. Ships, trade patterns and shipper attitudes are changing.

"With mammoth tankers, oil producers no longer are forced to use Suez. And more big tankers are coming. Nippon Kokan, a major Japanese shipbuilding firm, has just announced plans for a 42-million-dollar shipyard capable of turning out 500,000-ton tankers. Biggest ship now in service in only 209,000 tons.

"Many shippers between Europe and Asia began turning to the Panama Canal route as more practical even before the latest war. That trend will increase. And containerization is making it economical for some shipments between Japan and Northern Europe to take a ship-rail-ship route across the U.S."

4 September 1967

Egypt is saying the Suez Canal will stay closed indefinitely. It won't reopen "until all trace of Israeli aggression is eliminated." So says Egypt's Economic Minister in Cairo. That costs Egypt 4 million dollars a week in tolls.

Question: How long can Arabs afford to keep up these tactics?

Our man in Europe who watches the Iron Curtain provides this clue:

"Arabs need vast amounts of grain just to stay alive. Egypt alone must import 2.5 million tons a year. Algeria is asking Russia for 200,000 tons.

"What are they getting? Chicken feed. Russia, China, Bulgaria together have promised Egypt only 480,000 tons. Bulgaria is selling wheat to the Sudan.

"Other goods have been promised or offered for cash or credit: Polish industrial machinery, consumer goods and raw materials; Bulgarian industrial plant, for example. These can't be eaten any more than can arms from Russia."

Arabs may yet have to make peace with the West to get the food they need.

Diplomats are wondering how popular aid to Arabs is with citizens in Red lands anyway. Latest signs show they would much rather spend cash on cars.

Result: Commissars are not only buying autos and auto plants from the West; they're having to invest in a whole range of side products, too.

In Rumania, Krupp of Germany is building a tire factory. French firms are selling equipment for a factory that will make electrical accessories for cars.

Bulgaria has invited the German firms, Volkswagen and Mercedes, to set up service centers. The French have sold Sofia a tire factory.

Russia's decision to build a new car factory at Togliatti on the Volga has forced the Kremlin to start a technical school there to train workers. Western firms are offering to install service stations and train mechanics.

Communists are learning what the U.S. discovered 50 years ago: Arrival of the auto has a snowball effect that can't be stopped.

Resolutions of the Arab Summit Conference

Khartoum, Sudan - 29 August to 1 September 1967

1--The conference has affirmed the unity of Arab ranks, the unity of joint action, and the need for coordination and for the elimination of all differences. The kings, presidents, and representatives of Arab heads of state at the conference have affirmed their countries' adherence to and implementation of the Arab solidarity charter signed at the third Arab summit conference in Casablanca.

2--The conference has agreed on the need to consolidate all efforts to eliminate the effects of the aggression on the premise that the occupied lands are Arab lands and that the burden of regaining these lands falls on all the Arab states.

3--The Arab heads of state have agreed to unite their political efforts on the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the 5 June aggression. This will be done within the framework of the main principles to which the Arab states adhere, namely: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and adherence the rights of the Palestinian people in their country.

4--The conference of Arab finance, economy, and oil ministers recommended that suspension of oil pumping be used as a weapon in the battle. However, after thoroughly studying the matter, the summit conference has come to the conclusion that the pumping of oil itself can be used as a positive weapon, since oil is an Arab resource which can be used to strengthen the economy of the Arab states directly affected by the aggression, so that these states will be able to stand firm in the battle.

Therefore, the conference has decided to resume the pumping of oil, since oil is a positive Arab resource that can be used in the service of Arab goals. It can help those Arab states which were exposed to the aggression and lost economic resources to stand firmly and eliminate the effects of the aggression.

The oil-producing states have in fact participated in efforts to enable the states affected by the aggression to stand firm before any economic pressure.

5--The participants at the conference have approved the plan proposed by Kuwait to set up an Arab economic and social development fund on the basis of the recommendation of the conference of Arab finance, economy, and oil ministers in Baghdad.

6--The conference participants have agreed on the need to adopt measures to strengthen military preparation to face all eventualities.

7--The conference has decided to expedite the elimination of foreign bases in the Arab states.

Resolution adopted by the Arab heads of state who participated in the Khartoum conference from 29 August to 1 September 1967: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Kuwait, and the Kingdom of Libya have each agreed to pay the following annual amounts, which will be paid in advance every three months beginning mid October until the effects of the aggression are eliminated: Saudi Arabia--50 million pounds sterling; Kuwait--55 million pounds sterling; and Libya--30 million pounds sterling. In this way the Arab nation ensures that it will be able to carry on this battle, without any weakening, until the effects of the aggression are eliminated.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
15 June 1967

## Nasser's Threat to Nationalize Arab Oil Is Seen as Futile Weapon for Bargaining

A WALL STREET JOURNAL News Roundup

Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser is using the threat of nationalization of the Western-owned oil industry in Arab nations as a major ploy in his effort to salvage the best possible settlement terms after his bloc's military defeat by Israel.

But despite fiery broadcasts from Cairo, most international oilmen think Mr. Nasser's threat is a hollow one. They believe Cairo's assertions that the Arab nations could find alternate markets for their oil are just so much wishful thinking.

Meanwhile, the oil supply crisis for Western Europe eased considerably as tanker shipments resumed from Kuwait, second largest source of Arab oil. Saudi Arabia, the largest Arab oil producer, and several Arabian Gulf sheikdoms had resumed production and shipments earlier this week. Only major sources of Arab oil still shut down are Libya and Iraq, which account for a combined total of about 3 million barrels of daily output. For nearly a week as much as 6.5 million barrels of production had been closed down.

### Western Oil Interests

Arab nations, themselves, would be the biggest losers if they were to seize Western oil company properties, oilmen and other analysts generally agree. Arab nations currently reap more than \$2.6 billion annually in royalties and income taxes from Western companies. One estimate is that they make about twice as much a barrel on Arab oil as do the companies that produce it.

The market for most of the Free World's oil from all major producing nations is principally through the same international oil companies that produce the Arab world's oil. Russia not only has no need for Arab oil, but is perhaps its chief competitor. Russia reportedly has offered to increase its oil shipments to Spain's government-owned refineries to make up for shipments cut off from Arab countries. Russia already supplies about 5% of Western Europe's oil, at prices below those charged for Arab oil.

Cairo has suggested that France, Spain, Italy and Japan might be interested in succeeding U.S. and British companies in Arab countries. France already gets most of its oil needs from Arab Algeria and is, itself, an oil producing nation. Spain is one of Europe's smallest oil users. Italy is seeking to diversify its source of supply for less dependence on the Mideast, and plans to ask Western companies to develop its offshore oil. Japan is alarmed by its present 90% reliance on Mideast oil and is seeking alternate sources of supply in Indonesia and Alaska.

### Iran's Example Cited

Perhaps the greatest deterrent to any rash action by Arab nations is the memory of what happened when neighboring Iran seized its Western-owned oil properties in 1951. For three years, one of the world's major oil-producing

nations sold not one barrel of oil, and the world's largest oil refinery at Abadan remained shut down. Finally, Iran invited back an international consortium of Western oil companies to produce and sell its oil. Chief beneficiaries of Iran's shutdown were the Arab nations, which sharply increased their output and maintained those gains.

Oilmen also have been encouraged by the fact that governments of such nations as Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait have taken strong measures to protect oil facilities from local mobs during the current troubles.

Oil companies, of course, realize that the bad feeling stirred by Mr. Nasser's false charges of U.S. and British involvement in the Arab-Israeli war, and the wounded pride of the Arab world, are likely to make conditions difficult in Arab nations for some time to come.

"You can bet that some of this is going to be reflected in tougher terms in future oil agreements," says an official of one international oil company with holdings in four Arab nations.

One major problem, they note, is that the Arab people are pretty effectively cut off from learning the truth about the Arab-Israeli War. Mr. Nasser's control of the mobs in other Arab countries deters the local governments from themselves attempting to counter false reports from Radio Cairo and Radio Damascus, one oilman states.

The only nationalization move by an Arab nation so far is the seizure by Sudan of the small 20,000-barrels-a-day refinery at Port Sudan, jointly owned by British Petroleum Co. and the Royal Dutch-Shell Group. Shell officials confirmed that there are four or five Sudanese officials stationed at the refinery and that it is under a government nationalization decree. But they note the decree is aimed mainly at keeping output in Sudan, and it was built solely to supply Sudan.

Algeria also has placed oil subsidiaries of seven Western companies under "state control": El Paso Natural Gas Co., Mobil Oil Corp., Newmont Mining Corp., Phillips Petroleum Co., Royal Dutch-Shell, Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) and Tidewater Oil Co. Apparently, however, the move is primarily to enforce a ban against oil shipments to either the U.S. or Britain.

According to interviews by United Press International with diplomats from Communist nations, Russia is encouraging Arab threats to take over Western oil interests as a means of "blackmailing" the U.S. and Britain into pressuring Israel to return its territorial war gains. The diplomats said Russia was completely surprised by the outcome of the war and hoped to use Arab oil in its postwar diplomatic maneuvers.

It is of interest, however, that Egypt, itself, has not moved against Western oil interests on its territory. Until this year, Egypt was an oil-importing nation. With the aid of Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), it has become an oil exporter.

Phillips Petroleum also has found new oil fields in Egypt's Western Desert.

#### Shipments are Resumed

The oil crisis showed rapid improvement yesterday. Kuwait Oil Co. reported from London that a strike of dockworkers has been settled and tanker shipments resumed to nations other than the U.S. and Britain from that key Mideast oil-producing nation. Kuwait produces about 2.3 million barrels of oil daily. It has remained in production throughout the crisis, but strikes and demonstrations held up tanker loadings for 48 hours earlier this week.

Resumption of shipments from Kuwait, combined with the resumption of full production in Saudi Arabia, largest source of Arab oil, and several Arabian Gulf sheikdoms, greatly lessens oil supply problems. The only major production areas still shut down are Libya and Iraq, with combined output of about 3 million barrels a day, or less than half of the about 8.5 million barrels of daily production that had been closed down for nearly a week until Tuesday.

British Petroleum and Gulf Oil Corp. each

hold a 50% interest in Kuwait Oil Co. Gulf reported in Pittsburgh that there were no acts of violence and no sabotage of facilities connected with the strikes and demonstrations in Kuwait. Kuwait, like most Arab nations, still bans tanker shipments to the U.S. and Britain, Gulf noted.

Subsidiaries of British Petroleum, Jersey Standard and Royal Dutch-Shell each announced increases in the prices they charge for gasoline in West Germany. The increases averaged about 1 cent a gallon. Jersey Standard also boosted heating oil prices in West Germany, following an increase by British Petroleum Tuesday.

A spokesman for British Petroleum attributed the boosts to the added costs of shipping oil around Africa, rather than through the closed Suez Canal. But its subsidiary, Aral, A.G., asserted that the major factor was depressed prices "that have made it impossible to cover costs." Petroleum product prices have been generally depressed in Western Europe for the past two years.

TASS, Moscow  
6 September

#### AP REPORT ON SOVIET OIL SALES TO ISRAEL DENIED

"Bogged down in its Middle East policy and having lost its position in the Arab World as a result of support for the Israeli aggression, the United States would like to harm the good relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab states. It can think of nothing better than to disseminate forgeries on Soviet oil deliveries to Israel," journalist S. Petrov writes in IZVESTIYA today.

Petrov accuses the AP of disseminating information, with reference to an Israeli shipping company, that the USSR, allegedly, continues to deliver its oil to Israel.

"The falsehood of this report is obvious," Petrov says. It is significant, he remarks, that "not a single self-respecting Western newspaper ventured to take up this AP forgery."

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

16 June 1967

## Exports by Russia, Arab Disunity Ease Threat by Nasser to Use Oil as Hostage

A WALL STREET JOURNAL News Roundup

Two new developments appear to have taken the edge off President Gamal Abdel Nasser's campaign to use the threat of nationalization of Western oil properties in Egypt as a bargaining weapon to force better peace terms from Israel.

First, the Soviet Union agreed to ship an additional 1 million barrels of Russian oil to Spain's government-owned refineries to make up for shipments that normally would come from Arab nations.

Secondly, in separate meetings in Kuwait and Algiers, advocates of more extreme oil boycott action against the West apparently failed to convince such key producing nations as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to extend their ban on tanker movements beyond the current embargo on oil shipments to the U.S. and Britain.

Russia agreed to shipments of its oil to Spain, despite the fact it had been urging Mr. Nasser to raise the threat of nationalizing Western oil properties.

Furthermore, Mr. Nasser, whose Cairo radio has been shrilly calling for other Arab nations to nationalize their oil, quietly permitted Phillips Petroleum Co. to resume drilling operations in Egypt's Western Desert, where the company made an oil discovery of major importance last year.

Meanwhile, the overall oil supply situation remained unchanged from Wednesday. Libya, with about 1.7 million barrels of daily production, remained shut due to a combination of mob violence and strikes by Arab workers. Iraq, with about 1.4 million barrels of daily capacity, appears likely to remain closed for a lengthy period.

But Arab oil flowed freely to world markets, other than the U.S. and Britain, from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and the Arabian Gulf sheikdoms, with total output of more than 6.5 million barrels daily, augmented by non-Arab Iran, with about 2.1 million barrels of output. Tankers, of course, continued to take the long route around Africa from Mideast countries, as the Suez Canal remained closed.

Spain indicated that its decision to order more Russian oil may have long-term implications. It was reported that Spain won't quickly resume shipments from Arab nations without assurances its tankers won't be embargoed at Arab ports. Spain had contracted for about 3.5 million barrels of Russian oil before the Mideast troubles.

There were other reports in the oil industry that Russia intends to capitalize on the crisis to seek other increases in its export markets for oil. Russia already supplies about 5% of the oil for Western Europe, and is one of Italy's major sources.

### Egyptian Drilling Resumed

Iraq, which has banned shipment of its oil to any Western nation, and yesterday decreed a boycott of all products made in the U.S., Britain and West Germany, attempted to urge more extreme action on Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian oil officials earlier this week at a meeting in Kuwait. Similar requests of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were made at a meeting of Arab diplomats in Algiers later in the week. No change of policy has been announced by either country.

In announcing resumption of drilling operations in the United Arab Republic (Egypt), Phillips Petroleum president, Stanley Learned, asserted, "UAR authorities have been most cooperative and fair with Phillips." He added, "We anticipate that relations with the UAR will continue on this basis and that operations will be carried forward according to our agreements."

Phillips and Egyptian General Petroleum Corp., Egypt's government-owned oil agency, jointly hold 23.7 million acres of oil concessions in the Western Desert. They brought in Alamein 1-X as a major oil discovery well last year. Phillips reported it now is reassembling drilling crews to resume drilling of Qattara Rim 1-X, an exploratory well 30 miles from Alamein 1-X. Another well is scheduled to get under way soon at Mersa Martruh, Mr. Learned said.

He said that Phillips and Egyptian General Petroleum plan to begin soon development of the Alamein oil field, construction of a pipeline and marketing of the oil.

Until this year, Egypt was a net importer of oil. It became an exporter for the first time this year. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) holds a 50% interest in one of its major oil fields in the Gulf of Suez, in a joint venture with the Egyptian government.

It still was not known how long Libya's production is likely to remain shut down. Libyan output would be particularly helpful in combating the supply crisis since it is west of the Suez Canal. But there were indications of labor troubles added to the previous civil disobedience problems there. Libya reportedly has only about a 4,000-man army, and currently has half of these forces in Egypt.

### Long-Term Problems

There were growing indications that Mideast troubles may cause long-term marketing problems for Arab oil. Japan's Foreign Minister Takeo Miki asserted in Tokyo that Japan will seek to develop sufficient oil resources outside the Mideast to reduce its reliance on Mideast oil to about 50% of its total requirements 20 years hence from about 90% at present. Japan is one of the world's fastest-growing markets for refined petroleum products.



Western Europe also continued to experience increases in prices for refined products because of the crisis. A subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) raised prices of heating oil and diesel oil in Switzerland, blaming the closure of Suez, Mideast pipelines to Mediterranean ports and Libya. Earlier, several oil companies had raised heating oil and gasoline prices in West Germany.

Yet another ironic development is the fact that the only refineries in Syria and Jordan are dependent on oil moved through pipelines from Iraq and Saudi Arabia which they have closed.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
19 June 1967

## *Some British Firms Seek to Buy Soviet Oil; Russia Seen Gaining From Current Shortage*

A WALL STREET JOURNAL News Roundup

The Soviet Union, which suffered a political setback in the Arab-Israeli war, is apparently seeking economic gains from the Arab oil crisis it helped to create.

On the heels of its previously reported sale of an additional 1 million barrels of oil to Spain last week, Russia reportedly was seeking to sell oil to potential customers in other Western European countries experiencing difficulty in getting Arab oil.

The British Board of Trade announced that several British companies have made applications to import Russian crude oil since the start of the Mideast crisis, although such imports are currently banned by the British government.

Imperial Chemical Industries Inc., London, said it has been in touch with Britain's Ministry of Power as well as the Board of Trade on the possibility of importing Russian naphtha, although it hasn't made a formal application. Naphtha is a basic refined petroleum product used in making petrochemicals. ICI had sales equal to \$33.6 million to the Soviet bloc last year.

Oil users in Switzerland and West Germany also reported they've been approached by Russian oil salesmen since the start of the Mideast crisis. There were also reports of Russian offers to ship oil in their own tankers to Western European customers.

Present exports of Russian oil are estimated at about 1,000,000 barrels a day, up from 953,000 barrels a day in 1966 and only 838,000 barrels daily in 1965. Major buyers of Russian oil include Italy, France and the Scandinavian countries. Russia has announced plans to boost its oil output by about 2 million barrels daily the next four years, and much of this is likely to go to export markets.

### **'Commercial Advantage of a Situation'**

"The Russians are good ones at taking commercial advantage of a situation," asserts one oilman in London.

A spokesman at the Russian Embassy in London said he had "no information" on reports that Russia was actively exploiting the oil shortage by promoting sales of Russian oil. He charged that efforts were being made to create dissension between the Arabs and the Russians.

But even before the present crisis, it was obvious that Russia was becoming a major competitor for Arab countries as a source of oil for Western Europe. Italy last year imported 179,000 barrels of Russian oil a day, up from 151,000 the year before. France boosted its imports of Russian oil by 65% to 71,000 barrels a day. Sweden and Finland took 23% more Russian oil than they had the year before. And officially reported import prices by Western European governments showed Russian oil consistently sold at lower prices than that from the Mideast and North Africa.

One factor in the increased interest in Russian oil in the West was the fact that among those who trade with Soviet bloc nations, most must make barter transactions. And Russian oil is a commodity that can be readily be converted to hard cash after such a barter trade.

It wasn't yet known whether Russia's oil selling would raise resentment among the Arab nations who had obtained from the Soviet most of the military equipment that was used in the war with Israel.

### **Oil Supply Outlook Improves**

It was reported that Arab terrorists have blown up the oil pipeline that runs between Britain's Aden refinery and the harbor. Expectations are that the damage can be repaired in about four days. The stoppage will have little effect on ship traffic in the area because Aden's port is practically a ghost harbor now that ships are being diverted around Africa to avoid the Suez Canal.

There was continued improvement in the overall outlook for oil supplies from Arab nations. An oil company executive in London reported that it's expected that oil output will be resumed in Libya this week. U.S. companies

operating there, however, reported no change in the situation late last week.

It was reported that strikes of oil workers in Libya are scheduled to end today. If this should occur, it might clear the way for the Libyan government to permit resumption of oil production and tanker loadings. Libya closed down all oil output June 7 as a security measure. There were continued reports of civil disobedience in the country.

Libya, with about 1.7 million barrels of daily output is one of two major Arab oil producing areas still shut down. If production resumes it would be particularly helpful in easing oil supply problems, because it is west of the closed Suez Canal, and close to Mediterranean nations, which are most inconvenienced by the need to send ships around Africa.

The other Arab nation still out of production is Iraq, with about 1.4 million barrels of daily output. It's expected to be out for some time, but the industry probably could make up for this from other Mideast and North African oil sources if Libya resumes production.

Oil shipments from other Arab nations to the U.S. and Britain are still banned. But a joint committee of 21 U.S. companies submitted to U.S. Government agencies for approval plans to cope both with this boycott and the likely lengthy loss of use of the Suez Canal and pipelines to Syrian and Lebanese ports.

It would likely be the end of this month before this plan could be implemented, however, one oil executive estimated. The plan would permit companies to share sources of supply and tankers in ways that normally would be banned by antitrust laws.